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  AAAAaaaa   
AB’ YE DOĞRU: TÜRK EKONOMİSİNİN  
DİNAMİKLERİNİN MODELLENMESİ 
ÖZET 
 
Türkiye’ nin AB’ ne tam üyelik hedefi, ülkenin geleceği ile ilgili belirleyici role 
sahip olacaktır. Bununla beraber, AB üyeliğinin olası etkilerinin incelendiği 
çalışmaların ağırlıkla Gümrük Birliği’ nin etkileri ve kalitatif araştırmalarla sınırlı 
olduğunu görüyoruz. Bu çalışmada, Türkiye, AB ve geri kalan Dünya’ yı başlıca 
aktörler olarak alan bir model oluşturulması hedeflenmektedir. Model dahilinde 
tarım, sanayi ve hizmetler sektörlerinde üretimin yanı sıra işgücü ve sermaye arz-
talebi, bir geri bildirim mekanizması içinde çalışan fonksiyonlar ile  
tanımlanmaktadır. Model, bir temel senaryonun yanı sıra, Gümrük Birliği’nin 
kapsamının genişletilmesi, AB’den gelmesi planlanan yardımların serbest 
bırakılması ve/veya arttırılması, göç üzerindeki sınırlamaların azaltılması ve eğitime 
ayrılan payın arttırılması üzerine kurulu altı alternatif senaryo ve muhtemel bir 
üyelik senaryosu altında 2032 yılına kadar simüle edilmektedir. Çalışma sonucunda 
kişi başına düşen milli gelirin, olası bir üyelik dahilinde %60 kadar daha fazla 
artabileceği ve borç stoğunun daha kontrol edilebilir düzeylere çekilebileceği ama 
dış ticaret açığının büyüyebileceği görülmüştür. Göçün olumsuz etkisinin sınırlı 
olacağının anlaşıldığı modelde, olası bir üyeliğin iki tarafın da yararına olacağı 
gözlenmiştir. Simülasyon sonuçlarında, alternatif senaryolarda dahi, kişi başına 
düşen milli gelir başta olmak üzere bir çok parametrede önemli farklılıkların 
çıkabileceği öngörülmüştür. Yine de bütün senaryolarda, en az bir değişkenin daha 
kötüye gittiği, bu yüzden de hangi senaryo gerçekleşirse gerçekleşsin, uygun 
politikalarla desteklenmesi gerektiği anlaşılmaktadır. 
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 AAAaaA  
TOWARDS THE EU: MODELLING THE DYNAMICS  
OF THE TURKISH ECONOMY 
SUMMARY 
 
Turkey’s prospect of joining the EU will shape the country’s future. On the other 
hand, studies on the possible impact of EU membership on Turkey are usually 
confined to analyses of the Customs Union and to qualitative studies. The aim of this 
study is to build an economic model having Turkey, the EU and the Rest of the 
World as main agents. In the agricultural, manufacturing, and services sectors, 
production levels as well as labour, capital demand and supplies were estimated with 
possible descriptive functions that work in a feedback mechanism. The model was 
simulated until 2032 under a base scenario and six alternative scenarios, which 
considered policy options such as extending the customs union, allowing and/or 
increasing funds from the EU, bringing down the barriers on immigration, and 
increasing investment in education; as well as a possible membership scenario. It has 
been observed that benefits of membership could be very high, with GNP per capita 
increasing by around 60% more than it otherwise would and debt stock becoming 
more manageable. However, the trade deficit is expected to grow even more. The 
negative impact of immigration is observed to be limited and overall membership 
was observed to benefit both sides. Even under the alternative scenarios, substantial 
changes were observed, mainly as increases in the level of GNP per capita. 
However, under all scenarios, at least one factor among the others got worse, 
meaning that whatever scenario becomes reality, it will call for suitable policies to 
be implemented. 
 
xi 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
On October the 3rd, 2005, Turkey started accession negotiations with the EU, with 
the prospect of becoming its full member. This agreement came as a milestone on 
the rough road of relations between the EU and Turkey that started in 1961. 
On both sides, there are groups that are discontent with the prospect of Turkey’s 
integration into the EU. Reasons vary, but can be grouped under political, social and 
economical headings. 
On the political level, EU member states express their reservations about the high 
level of representation that Turkey would be granted in such a setting. The current 
unstable and conservative outlook of Turkish politics, and the human rights 
violations in particular (including political rights and minority rights), make many 
Europeans concerned over entering into a political union with Turkey. On the 
Turkish side, it is the question of defining the borders of sovereignty within the 
context of EU federalism and worries of a perceived interventionism of the Union’s 
organs which shape the political debate as to the accession process. Similar concerns 
though are raised in the course of internal debates in all EU members.  
However, both Turkey and the EU are aware of the enhanced level of collective 
bargaining and influence on a global level that they would enjoy from Turkey’s 
accession. This is especially crucial for the EU, which wants to establish itself as a 
major global player. The issue may as well be a test on the extents to which 
democracy could reach within the boundaries the EU promotes. 
On the social side, the conservatism and the patriarchal values embedded in the 
Turkish culture, especially regarding the role of women and the rights of the 
individual, are major sources of turco-scepticism. Similarly, some Turks believe that 
such a membership could make Turkey lose its values. Nevertheless, the dynamics 
of the young Turkish population and differences in cultural values that Turkey could 
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 contribute to the Union, can be used as building material to achieve the European 
concept of being united in diversity and to facilitate a fast opening of Turkish 
society. 
It is the economic front though which constitutes the core of the debate. There are 
several apprehensions which make EU member states have second thoughts about 
Turkey’s membership. Is a huge influx of migrants is awaiting the EU? Will one 
such endanger the allocation of funds within the union and increase its level of 
income disparity? Will the already fragile EU budget be even more challenged with 
a possible Turkish membership? On the Turkish side, concerns focus on economic 
dependence and agriculture, as well as imports substitution ratio. Still, the ageing 
and dwindling population dynamics in the EU and an economy that has lost its pace 
and cannot compete with global players such as China and the US mean that the 
Union could well benefit from Turkey’s young and dynamic population and fast-
growing economy. 
The promise for change within the Turkish society and politics, as well as stability 
and steady growth in the Turkish economy, may bring down the reservations of both 
sides. Conflicting views after all have marked all phases of EU enlargement, 
especially when big countries like Poland are concerned. All these reservations 
though still make it a question whether Turkey will eventually achieve full 
membership or will have to be content with an alternative. 
The course of the Turkish economy and politics will be largely dependent on the 
course that EU negotiations may take. Every step forward with the EU increases the 
rate of foreign investments and the level of stability within the country. Mutual 
agreements signed on various fronts determine the trends in the Economy. 
However, it is still an issue of debate to what extent all these issues could be 
effective and if so in which direction. The arguments on either front are strong 
enough to be equivocating. 
In this study, a simulation model is designed to predict the future outlook of the 
Turkish Economy. In the model, population, government, and various sectors are 
used as building blocks for economy in Turkey and the EU, and possible future 
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 trends and to what extent which policies, including a possible membership scenario 
may have, are evaluated. 
1.1 Literature Review 
The literature concerning our case can be analysed in three sections. Studies 
concentrating on possible effects of Turkish Membership into the EU; Studies on the 
Turkish Economy and Social Structure and studies on the European Economy; 
Technical Literature on Systems Dynamics and Economics. 
The studies that are analysing possible effects of a Turkish membership into the 
European Union have especially increased after mid 1990’s, when the prospect of an 
eventual membership became more plausible than ever before. Most of the literature 
reviewed though offered a combination of all of them rather than belonging solely to 
one category. 
Lejour (2004) emphasises that the more the Turkish institutions choose to 
harmonise with the European ones, the higher will be the benefits of membership. 
The possible economic effects of membership will be felt in terms of free movement 
of labour, access to internal markets and an improvement in institutions in Turkey. 
The benefits of such an enlargement are argued to weigh over the negative effects 
exerted on the economies. 
Özdemir (2004) on the other hand, draws attention to the stabilising effects of a 
possible membership and stresses on the potential gains that such an atmosphere 
would introduce in the economy. 
Griffith (2005) tries to show how much a possible membership would cost in terms 
of structural funds, whereas Grethe (2003), advocating that extension of Customs 
Union to the Agricultural Sector could benefit Turkey a great deal, goes on assessing 
possible impacts of Common Agricultural Policy on the Turkish Agriculture. 
Although there are conflicting views on possible customs union agreements, 
Neyaptı et al. (2002) shows that the Customs Union with the EU has increased 
Turkey’s trade volume. De Santis (2003), on the other hand, studies, on a panel 
dataset, through a model based on the Harris-Todaro Model and CES functions, 
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 through a computable general equilibrium analysis, the impact of the Customs Union 
with the EU on internal migration in Turkey and concludes that the Customs Union 
overall has been welfare increasing in Turkey. He also argues that subsidising the 
labour market only is impractical. Overall, around 750 thousand people are expected 
to move to larger cities within this framework. 
A report prepared by State Planning Authority in Turkey (DPT) in 2004 considers 
possible effects of membership from different angles and starts by giving a brief 
summary of reforms undertaken by the Turkish government and the history of 
Turkey-EU relations. The study then bases itself on a model prepared by the 
organisation and makes projections for possible outlooks of the Turkish Economy 
based on base and bullish scenarios. According to these models, Turkish PPP is 
expected to reach around one third of the EU average by 2020’s. The unemployment 
rate is expected to fall by this time and the country is expected to get more services 
oriented than today. It is also argued in the report that the Turkish labour force will 
become better qualified and the population increase will reach to a halt by 2020’s. 
The report combines qualitative and quantitative evaluations on possible impacts 
that membership could have. 
The EU Commission has been publishing due reports on Turkey. In one of the 
reports published in 2002 some important factors that are involved with a possible 
membership are evaluated. In the report, it is stressed that accession of Turkey to the 
Union would be challenging both for the EU and Turkey and that if well managed, it 
would offer important opportunities for both.  
The report stresses that Turkey’s accession would be different from previous 
enlargements due to size, politics and Turkey’s place over all internationally. 
The economic impact of Turkey’s accession on the EU is thought to be positive but 
relatively small, and dependent on how Turkey will be in the future. However, it is 
expected to raise the disparities among regions within the union 
Although the integration of Turkey into the internal market is deemed to be 
beneficial, it is mentioned that agriculture in Turkey needs special attention and 
policies.  
 The budgetary impact on the other hand is estimated to depend on policies adopted 
by the EU and prevalent in Turkey 
In a paper published in 2003, Poschl et al. tries to assess to what extent Turkey and 
other EU economies are comparable and some coefficients based on macroeconomic 
similarity are derived. Based on possible policy mechanisms, possible impacts of 
membership are evaluated. 
Yazganarikan (2003), studies economic outlooks of the new members of the EU 
and compares them with Turkey, together with export similarity comparisons, based 
on which she tries to extrapolate on possible impact of the latest round of 
enlargement on Turkey. 
Harrison et al. (1997), suggest that Turkey would gain between 1 and 1.5 percent of 
gross domestic product (GDP) annually from the customs union arrangement with 
the EU, depending on what complementary policies it adopts and estimate lost tariff 
revenues will amount to 1.4 percent of GDP. In order to compensate for this, around 
16% VAT is proposed, together with privatisation of inefficient state-businesses. 
Kirişçi in 2003 and in 2004 has published two papers. The first one deals with 
Turkey as becoming a country of first asylum and stresses on the declining number 
of workers that depart from Turkey to other countries. The second paper on the other 
hand focuses more on possible implications of harmonisation of migration policies 
between Turkey and the EU. 
Coşar (2002) in a study made for the central bank of Turkey, concentrates on price 
and income elasticities of the Turkish demand and offers functions based on panel 
data. Senhadji and Montenegro (1999), on the other hand, in a similar study for the 
IMF studies export demand elasticities for some countries, including Turkey, in the 
world. 
Nevertheless, when simulation models are considered, World Scan is probably the 
one that receives the widest acclaim when trying to guess on the possible number of 
migrants from Turkey. They give their estimates around 2.7 million. The model 
itself is built on different sectors and regions, based on market clearance. WorldScan 
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 (Mooij and Tang, 2004) distinguishes labour, capital and technology as primary 
sources of production. 
The labour supply is taken to be exogenous, capital mobility imperfect technical 
change is exogenous. The model considers learning from different countries possible 
yet slow. However in some versions, spill-overs from R&D are also 
allowed.(Lejour et al., 2004). The patterns of demand for different goods change 
over time. Services become more important than either manufacturing or agriculture. 
This reflects different income elasticities for different goods as well as changes in 
relative price. National savings rates depend the demographic structure of the 
population, based on empirical work. 
Within the given framework of WorldScan, four scenarios are considered: 
International trade where a partial liberalizing international trade is observed;   
Strong Europe in which where strong harmonization between European institutions 
is assumed, and Europe is considered to be taking the lead in trade and policy 
making; Global Economy where the climate change becomes more apparent, the 
roles of governments decrease whereas labour mobility and regional cooperation 
increases; Transatlantic Market, where the EU takes on a looser level of cooperation 
and the role of the US becomes more apparent, Europe being forced into a dilemma 
while dissolving its large state; Regional Communities where divergence among 
clubs in the EU become more accentuated and pressure groups get more influential. 
Through these scenarios, various policy options are evaluated for an uncertain future 
awaiting Europe. Examples of issues covered span over environmental policy, 
infrastructure, energy, spatial issues and ageing. The model is long term in nature 
and is updated regularly for different markets. However, its focus is duly on the 
European Union only and hence is concentrated more on the EU at large. 
HERMIN Models, developed on classical lines and adapted to empirical cases, on 
the other hand, take into account determinants of supply and demand in various 
sectors and try to judge, through a system of interplay between the agents, levels of 
production and other indicators in the economy. The HERMIN models have already 
been used within the EU, for example in a study of the likely macroeconomic impact 
5 6
 of the Single European Market (SEM) and the Structural Funds (or Community 
Support Framework (CSF)) on the EU peripheral economies (ESRI, 1997) that drew 
on earlier work on the EU HERMES system of models (d'Alcantara and Italianer, 
1982). Another such study has recently been done for Poland, considering the 
possible outcomes of an eventual membership and has come up with estimates on 
the number of migrants (of around 1.3 million) and changes in economic 
composition. (Bradley, 2003) 
The attempts to model different problems that the world faces, on the other hand, 
expand over a wide horizon. World Models, inspired by The Limits to Growth report 
(Meadows et al.,1972) of the Club of Rome, which is an informal group of 30 
individuals from different disciplines, clearly mark such an ambitious aim. In the 
report, the term “world problematique” is used in order to represent the serious 
problems regarding the interdependent components of the world, as economic, 
political, natural and social. These problems are thought to be shared by different 
countries of the world at once and at various levels of aggregation, long term 
projections of some of the key aspects of the phenomena are studied. The series of 
models started with Forrester’s World-2 Model, which arguably was offering 
solutions that were too specific when compared with the high level of aggregation 
that it proposed. Eight major models were later developed in this model’s legacy, 
among which GLOBUS, Leontieff (UNGLOBAL) and Barlioche models that stand 
out as building more on socio-political problems rather than physical problems as 
such; EcoCosm that is more individualistic in its perspective and The Futures of 
Global Interdependence (FUGI) that tries to consider the possible impact of further 
industrialization in the world. 
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 2. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Turkish Economy has shown great perturbations in its history, with regards to 
demographic and sectoral composition over its history. Although the basic sense of 
movement headed towards a more developed society, not all parameters were 
optimised at once. Whereas the GNP grew steadily, so did the public debt stock and 
inflation, bringing into one’s mind, whether this growth will be sustainable. 
Determining the future outlook of the Turkish Economy is a major challenge, given 
the conflicting results of the pattern of development. 
Whether good or bad, most analysts would agree that the course of change that EU 
integration will take in Turkey, will be determinant for the future of the Turkish 
Economy. On the Turkish side, that trade harmonisation with the EU may push some 
sectors in the economy in peril, that the general transformation of the economy that 
may not have predictable outcomes and pressure that the new social outlook would 
exert on the labour are some of the key questions on the Turkish side. Whether 
structural funds to be obtained from the EU and free movement of labour could 
offset these effects or help them lead in a positive direction is a challenge for both 
Turkey and the EU.  
On the European Union side, the immigration flow that would exert a pressure on 
the local labour markets and the high burden of cohesion funds that Turkey would 
require to catch up which would endanger the already existing funds to other less 
developed regions, coupled with a greater set of issues concerning manageability, 
make the issue of Turkish accession even a greater challenge, which is bound to 
effect the path of Turkey’s EU integration. 
In order to be able to comment on the final outcome of a possible Turkish 
membership, and differentiate between the effects of different policy alternatives, an 
economic model is needed. Studies concerning the issue up to now, have been very 
often one-sided, aimed at revealing only one of the aspects at a time, which means, 
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 keeping a majority of outcomes as given. Comprehensive studies carried out in the 
field on the other hand, most often either inclined less on the particularities of the 
Turkish market and treated it on equal footing with the other agents or did not 
necessarily have an EU prospect. 
In this project, the main aim is to come up with a possible model on the Turkish 
economy. Through out the modelling phase, the key determinant is taken as to be the 
relations vis-à-vis the EU. The main goal is to model and be able to see to what 
extent figures in the Turkish economy are sensitive towards the EU and judge what 
possible future trends may duly be observed, within the confinements of due 
assumptions and limitations on which the model will be built.  
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3. METHODOLOGY 
When dealing with the prospect of Turkish-EU relations, one is confronted with a 
large-scale socio-economic system.  
The social aspect of the system, which arguably is stronger, leads one into taking the 
issue in a more qualitative framework. Although such a framework would bring 
about a higher level of flexibility and a broader perspective, it gets harder if not 
totally impossible for one to get exact inferences from such an evaluation. The less 
quantitative the evaluation becomes, the vaguer the results will be. On the other 
hand, quantitative methods require models with a degree of manageability which 
translates as a necessity to simplify the situations usually based on a large set of 
assumptions. Therefore, they are by their nature more simplistic and indeed less 
comprehensive than qualitative ones. This very aspect of quantitative studies may be 
justified on the grounds that every model is a simplification of the whole and that 
this is one reason why models indeed are used: to see the broad lines and not the 
specifics of a system. However, not all qualitative measures are easily quantifiable 
and this is where the models get to be reliant on assumptions, hence jeopardizing the 
credibility of our models. 
Despite all shortcomings of quantitative models, within the context of our study, 
system dynamics approach (Forrester, 1961; Forrester, 1968; Sterman 2000) is 
evaluated to be the most appropriate methodology. System dynamics is designed to 
overcome limitations of quantitative approaches in studying systems with some 
qualitative aspects. Jay W. Forrester, founder of the methodology, entertains this 
aspect of systems dynamics studies in his book, Industrial Dynamics (Forrester, 
1961). Forrester in his book stresses that he believes, patterns on qualitative data 
could be hypothesised quantitatively and that it could just as well work. 
Sterman on the other hand, also expresses that he thinks that the benefits outweigh 
the losses on analytical tractability. 
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 From this perspective, one is provided with qualitative as well as quantitative tools 
to build up on. 
The simulation-based experimentation procedure of system dynamics helps to 
understand the dynamic complexity of the studied system, to identify the important 
policy entrance points, and to test long-term system-wide effects of policies 
(Sterman, 2000). The methodology offers non-linear feedback mechanisms, which 
implies a level of complexity that other quantitative methods may fall short of 
clearly grasping. 
The purpose of dynamic models is more on getting an idea of the patterns and 
relative effects of different policies rather than pinpointing at specific values that 
elements of the system may take on at a stage. This indeed implies that the study has 
still a large room for qualitative judgements and overall can be used for long term 
studies. In most quantitative methods, error propagation over the long run makes the 
observers all the more confined to short term. (Meadows,1985). Indeed using this 
methodology though, quantitative models can be incorporated into the system, 
making it as easy to use both for the short run and the long run alike. 
In our model though, we will be relying more on the quantitative aspect and a 
system of regressions, and not necessarily confine ourselves to a strictly systems 
dynamics model. Yet the fact that we should be looking for patterns and nested sets 
of variables rather than eventual outcomes, try to judge possible effects of different 
policies in a feedback mechanism and indeed use certain proxies, bring us closer to 
the realm of system dynamics. 
Two main building blocks are used in modelling the system of concern. One of these 
building blocks, Stocks are accumulating variables that identify the state of the 
system at a time. They are controlled through instantaneous inflows and outflows, 
which are called flow variables. 
Figure 3.1 shows us a simple stock-flow representation of an increase in population 
in a system. Here, the stock variable of the (Population) is represented with a 
rectangular box. The thick arrows with valves connected to the stock variable are the 
flow variables related to this stock. The ways they are pointing indicate the direction 
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 of these flows. The population as can be seen increases with births and decreases 
with deaths. The value of the flow variable Births indicate the amount of population 
added to the system, whereas the value of the flow variable Births indicate the 
amount of population subtracted from the system.  
The other variables, which are shown in circles, are called auxiliary (or converter) 
variables. They are used for calculation of flows and defining the links between 
components of the system. They typically are variables that take on instantaneous 
values contingent on the other parts of the system and do not accumulate. To this 
end they can be used to calculate variables of interest. Curved arrows indicate causal 
relation between two variables in the system. In this example, the number of Births 
is formulated as a product of birth fraction (BirthFraction) and the amount of 
population at hand (Population). (Eq. 3.1) A similar calculation is applicable for the 
number of deaths. (Eq. 3.2) The amount of population at each term will hence be the 
amount it previously had, plus the number of births and minus the number of deaths. 
(Eq. 3.3) 
Population
Births Deaths
BirthFraction DeathFraction
 
Figure 3.1: A Simple Stock-Flow Diagramme 
As can be seen, the methodology is indeed built up on a set of differential equations, 
in which stocks represent state variables and flows represent rates of change. 
Population
 t = Populationt-1 + Births t - Deaths t   (3.1) 
Births
 t  = BirthFraction  × Population t    (3.2) 
Deaths
 t = DeathFraction × Population t    (3.3) 
Differential equations regarding the same system are also given in Eq1Methods  
The methodology, which is composed of an iterative modelling process and 
experimentation, is mainly composed of five stages (Sterman, 2000). The first is 
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 problem articulation, which includes the identification of the dynamic problem. As 
in all modelling practices, identifying the problem requires setting the boundaries 
and a level of simplification so that the main characteristics of the problem, key 
variables and the time horizon of the study can be traced easily. 
In the second stage of the methodology, modellers are expected to develop a 
dynamic hypothesis. This process requires characterization of the feedback 
relationships between system variables with respect to the observed past behaviour 
of the system. 
The third step consists of building the simulation model based on the hypothesis 
developed regarding the causal structure. Following the building of stock-flow 
structure of the model, parameters, equations and initial conditions are estimated 
based on the observed past data and system behaviour, through regressions or in 
some cases, visual inspection. The fourth step of the methodology is testing the 
validity of the built model with respect to the problem of concern. Testing process is 
usually performed concurrently within model building. 
The final step is using the model in experiments for policy analysis and design. This 
experimentation step enables to study behaviour of the system under various 
policies, scenarios and conditions. Results obtained give effective information that 
helps to identify policy entrance points, and evaluate and design useful policies. 
In our model, we will mainly derive possible functions to assess to what extent 
different dynamics could be affecting each other within the system. To this end, our 
main methodology will involve assigning functions to be fit in to a series of 
dependent and independent variables, in a continual inlay of various factors. 
As software, Stella®, developed by ISEE systems, will be used, due to its flexibility, 
ease of use and technical tools. 
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 4. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL 
The model basically assumes that Agricultural, Manufacturing and Services-oriented 
sectors all produce certain goods, hence setting the income level for the country. A 
certain share of the income is distributed along these different sectors, hence setting 
the demand for each of them. In turn, this demand is either to be supplied from 
domestic or international markets, taking in account different trade barriers and 
relative prices as well as the demand and production levels. The international market 
is grouped as the EU and non-EU (named Rest of the World- RoW).  
The government makes money out of domestic and international sales and may 
borrow some money if needed. It has to duly pay an interest and capital amount if it 
chooses the latter. This tax money is distributed along investments, government 
expenditures and investment in education. A substantial part of the government 
expenditures are thought to be becoming a part of the overall disposable income 
whereas investment in education sets the level of literacy for the country. 
It was also assumed that throughout integration with the EU, some funds may be 
available to Turkey, which would translate as increases in revenues. 
Based on sales and efficiency measures, investments are done in different sectors. 
On the other hand, people choose to work in different sectors based on the wages 
offered and potential. The level of literacy, amount of people in the sector and 
capital accumulation set the level of production. 
The population may choose to remain out of the workforce, may be too small or too 
old to be a part of the workforce or may move abroad, based on the income levels 
and barriers to immigration. 
For the EU and the rest of the world on the other hand, a fixed increase for each of 
the sectors was assumed.  
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 In total, there are 172 variables in the model (26 of which are stocks), besides 198 
equations. 
4.1 Production Functions 
4.1.1 Overview 
The level of disaggregation in sectors of production depends on the purposes of the 
study. In some studies, it may be easier to work with only one sector of production 
whereas in another breakdowns into the specific modes of productions may be 
required. In most qualitative and quantitative work where different sectors are 
considered for Turkey, disaggregation into three sectors, namely the industrial, 
agricultural and services sectors are deemed appropriate. 
Such a distinction, on being well in conformity with much of the classic literature, 
also allows for the applicability of theories such as Rostow’s stages of development 
(Rostow, 1960) while studying patterns. In a developing society, the role of 
agriculture is expected to shrink whereas that of industry and later services is 
expected to increase. Agricultural sectors, typically exemplifying primary 
production differ from industrial sectors where price elasticity of demand is 
relatively higher. Therefore the level of agricultural production in a country where 
population growth has stabilised should be expected to stabilise also, whereas the 
demand for industrial goods would be expected to rise gradually until reaching 
another level of saturation, albeit on relative terms. The services sector on the other 
hand, is built on tertiary sectors that are expected to flourish all the more as a halt in 
industrial production becomes imminent. 
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Figure 4.1: Production Levels in Turkey over the time (D.I.E.) 
As can be seen in the Figure 4.1, production levels in Turkey seem to be moving 
along the mentioned patterns. As the country gets richer and richer, first we see that 
the agricultural sector gives way to the industrial sector and relatively stops growing, 
and as the industrial sector starts to gain momentum, possibly also helped by its 
spill-overs, the services sector reaches a boom, leaving both far behind. 
Judging by these patterns, it would be logical to assume that the reasons that 
underlie each of these sectors differ one from another. Otherwise, one would not be 
able to foresee that the relative share of agriculture would drop from 43% to around 
12.5% and that the share of services would rise up to 58% from 43% in the 
meantime. (as seen in Figure 4.2) Although in the broad sense, they have similar 
impetus as the economy grows or shrinks, the scales of shocks are not necessarily 
the same. This common part of the behaviours can be argued to be stemming from 
the input variables that are comparable for each of these.  
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Figure 4.2: Share of employment in different sectors in Turkey (D.I.E.) 
After all, such a disaggregation is also required since obviously neither the taxes nor 
the demand characteristics of the sectors are the same, as will be discussed later.  
As for specific functions that could be used to estimate each of the production 
factors, one is confronted with a variety of tools to choose from. Constant Elasticity 
of Substitution, Cobb-Douglas, Translog, Diewert functions are some of the 
production functions that are offered while trying to guess the value of the output, 
based on different amounts of inputs. All of these functions face similar problems 
due to their natures of aggregation, as addressed by Felipe, J and McCombie, JSL 
(2001), since the panel data undermines the shifts of prices and other empirical 
shocks especially in the short run. However, the argument does recognize that good 
fits for estimation are usually possible with these functions, although while 
commenting on their implications one has to be more vigilant. The function itself is 
easy to estimate, through linearisation, and widely used. Its exponential character on 
the other hand, provides a better reflection of ideals set out in Samuel in 1972 on 
how production functions could be. 
4.1.2 Modelling the Dynamics 
Production was grouped under agricultural, manufacturing oriented (named 
Industrial) and Services sectors. 
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 For each of the sectors, Cobb-Douglas Production function was used to determine 
the amount of wealth produced. (Eq. 4.1)  
βα KLAQ ⋅⋅=
    (4.1) 
α and β are defined as the technology coefficients. The level of technology 
applicable on the labour force was assumed to be proportional to the level of literacy 
hence, the coefficient was considered to be actually Literacy*α . L here denotes the 
amount of labour and K denotes the amount of capital available. 
)ln()ln()ln()ln( KLAQ ⋅+⋅+= βα
  (4.2) 
For each of the sectors, the production function was first linearised (by taking 
natural logarithms as seen in the Eq. 4.2) and corresponding values for the labour, 
capital accumulation and production were taken from DIE. The level of literacy will 
later be explained. Regressions were carried out on each of these and the following 
values were obtained at Adjusted R2 of 0.72, 0.89, 0.9 for Agricultural, Industrial 
and Services-based production respectively. 
As for the EU and the RoW, the levels of production are only assumed to be 
increasing at constant rates, based on projections used by DPT. 
4.2 Labour 
4.2.1 Overview 
Labour in Turkey has, following the stages of development theory, from the agrarian 
sector to industrial and the services sectors in the recent years. This has indeed 
followed up a massive urbanisation trend that has virtually rendered the majority of 
the population urban. The places where the labour force in the cities could be 
employed duly differed from the supply in the rural parts. This shift has been both 
due to saturation of employment opportunities in the rural, as well as security and 
attire of the cities (Porrel, 1982). Either way the arguments go, the shift in the 
labour distribution has resulted in structural unemployment since the new workers 
neither could adapt to the new set of jobs, nor could the relevant sectors be able to 
offer as many jobs as fast.   
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of the Active Workforce, Turkey (D.I.E.) 
Figure 4.3 shows the change in the amount of labour used in different sectors for 
Turkey, together with unemployment rates. Again remembering the production 
values, it may be observed that the demand for labour is the most intense in the 
services industry. 
As for the reasons why labour chooses to work in this or that sector, different 
assumptions have been proposed. 
However, in many of the studies, including the job search models of Mc.Cormick 
(1990), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), the basic way through which the labour 
demand-side, signalled to the labour supply was taken as the wages. The labour 
force, on the other hand, considering the wage levels, benefits and their educational 
attainment, would decide on which sector to join.  
On the other hand, aggregate job search models rely on the necessity to have a 
backward bending curve when the labour supply is concerned. In the microeconomic 
Theory on the other hand, Beveridge Curve is used to illustrate the relation between 
unemployment and job search. 
Therefore in our case, exponential functions are required to give the smoothened 
curve effect debated in the literature. And it will be assumed that all other forms of 
signalling to the labour force from the demand side will be through the 
determination of the wages. The supply side on the other hand, will be based on the 
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 number of unemployed and the level of literacy available. Based on these two, an 
equilibrium will be reached at each time slice for the amount of labour joining in to a 
particular sector.  
The wages in an industry are dependent, as neoclassical economists argue, on the 
productivity of the labour. However, due to market irregularities, wage stickiness 
may occur, causing shocks in the market. Hall and Jones (2005) propose a model, 
where wages are determined through a process of bidding in an environment with 
possible wage stickiness. The labour demand side hence determines the level of 
wages based on the productivity but the supply side also has some pressure 
mechanisms to bestow upon the wages.  
On the other hand, as Hannula (1998) suggests, firms sometimes consciously pay 
higher wages for attracting more qualified labour. The qualification of the labour on 
the other hand, may be though of as a function of its productivity and literacy. 
In our model, since all cases are considered to be affecting the wages, the labour 
demand side would offer higher wages to the supply if the labour is better educated, 
and less if there is too much labour available. On the other hand, the minimum wage 
requirements imposed by the governments should be seen as mechanisms through 
which the pressure may be imposed on the labour demand side, while setting the 
wages.  
4.2.2 Modelling the Dynamics  
In our model, the determinants on the choice of sector to work for people was taken 
to be dependent on the wages offered by these sectors (presumably more people 
would want to work in a place if the wage levels are high enough) and the level of 
literacy as well as the total available workforce. The level of literacy was taken into 
consideration since it may be the case that people choose to work in different sectors 
since they are trained to be so. They may even accept working for less, for self 
satisfaction. On the other hand, the level of literacy in a population sets the demand 
for labour in these sectors. 
In an alternative setting, based on the levels of production in the previous terms and 
the international demand, imputed levels of production were calculated for each of 
20 
 the sectors and they were incorporated into the calculations on the labour force 
levels joining in these sectors. Marginal and average levels of productivity were also 
taken in account. However, the results turned out to give worse function fits and 
hence were not used. 
A linearization, comparable to the one taken for the levels of production was carried 
out, this time substituting for the new set of independent variables. Adjusted R2 
levels of 71%, 85% and 94.5% were observed for agricultural, industrial and 
services sectors. 
The values for each of the variables were again taken from DIE. 
As for the EU, the demand for labour is assumed to be a function of the total levels 
of production, based on a simple regression. 
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Figure 4.4: Unemployment Rates in Turkey (D.I.E.) 
  
4.3 Population 
4.3.1 Overview 
The population growth rates in Turkey have slowed down consistently since late 
1980’s. Although birth rates have ever been in decline since 1970’s (with a sharp 
decline and recuperation during the coup), the fact that the death rates have always 
been decreasing have kept the population growth rates show a downward pattern. 
High growth rates of population have hampered basic service provisions such as on 
education and infrastructural needs and have been blamed for the relatively lower 
rates of human development in Turkey. 
High unemployment rates are also linked to this phenomenon. The rise in 
population, as it has turned out, failed to keep up with an equal expansion in the 
labour demand, hence forcing many people out of the labour market. Nevertheless, 
especially after mid-1990’s, considerable slowdown in population growth, coupled 
with higher demands for investment, have helped in reducing unemployment. 
An important phenomenon to be kept in mind while dealing with unemployment 
rates in Turkey is the existence of a high level of work aversion. Labour 
participation rates in Turkey are lower than in the rest of Europe. This actually partly 
stems from structural reasons. As explained before, Turkey has been urbanising at a 
rate that it cannot cater for. Among many deficiencies that such an uncontrolled pace 
brings, one can see that the labour stock, accustomed to different modes of 
production and not met with a demand that grows at the same rate, finds itself out of 
the employed sector. Yet, persistence in the unemployed sector (as can be seen in 
Mukherji, 2002), forces this labour force out of the active sector. This later 
phenomenon is also proven by the dataset offered by DIE.  
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Figure 4.5: The Ratio of the population out of the workforce (D.I.E.) 
In some cases on the other hand, the pessimist approach prevails from the very start 
and people simply decide to opt out of the work force. Family related reasons also 
play a part in this. 
Keeping out of the workforce is also heavily dependent on conservatism in the place. 
The bulk of the Turkish labour stock that keeps out of the labour force is made up of 
women (72%). The labour force participation rate for women is less than half of that 
of men. Participation rate of women in the rural is up to 3 times more than in the 
urban sites and even in the urban localities, they are often employed in family 
related sectors. A reason for the deceptive rates of labour participation in the rural 
areas is partly due to the fact that the boundaries of the work place and the house are 
often not clearly defined, since the agricultural sector in turkey is dominated by 
small home-owned businesses. Even when employed in the urban sectors, within the 
framework of tendencies in Turkey, women are expected to be catering for the 
housework. Therefore, considering that the bulk of women who refrained from 
joining in the labour force have said they were house-wives, the distinction among 
the working and non working women is often reduced to being housewives and 
labourers against housewives only. This indeed shows the level of conservatism 
inherent in the society.  
Another reason for women keeping out of the labour force has to do with the fact 
that they are often less qualified. Again due to conservatism, many women are 
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 deliberately kept out of the school, unlike their male counterparts. Whereas for men, 
this would nevertheless allow for jobs that rely on manual labour only, for women, 
this option is all the more unavailable, considering societal roles and lack of physical 
stamina. Many such women in the urban areas end up in the informal sector as 
cleaning ladies.  
The more the society is educated on the other hand, the less being a housewife seems 
to be a reason for keeping out of the labour force.  The relation is also valid for the 
number of workers in family owned businesses and literacy.  
One final remark that could be made on the distribution of the population among 
various groups is that as people get more and more educated, they tend to join the 
labour force at a later age. This is quite intuitive since the more years it takes to 
study, the later will the person be available for active work. One exception to this 
could be though of coming from executive studies but their share overall is 
negligible. Also again as levels of literacy rise, health conditions ameliorate and 
people die at later ages. However, it is also known that the age at which these 
labourers leave the workforce is postponed. Nevertheless this phenomenon, known 
as ageing in the society, coupled with the late age of entry to the job sector, inflates 
the number of those who are out of the workforce by definition. This population as 
expected is dependent either directly or indirectly (through social funds) on the 
active population. If the increase in the productivity of the active population with the 
mentioned increase in literacy, health conditions and technology are enough to offset 
these effects, the country can be expected to sustain. However, especially in the EU, 
the conditions seem to be overall unpromising. Ageing, in the case of Europe is 
getting more and more a problem on development and sustainability. 
Therefore the composition of the population is quite crucial when judgements are to 
be made on the economy. 
4.3.2 Modelling the Dynamics 
The population is thought to be composed of four main groups: those who cannot 
work, those who choose not to work, those who are unemployed and those who 
work in either of the sectors. 
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 Those who cannot work are basically the elderly and children. The population in this 
group increases (and decreases) with natural increase and people leaving the 
workforce and decreases with children who grow up and join the workforce. The 
number of births is contingent on the natural increase fraction and the total 
population. In order to find the natural increase fraction, which was assumed to be 
dependent on the level of literacy, a regression was cast, yielding an Adjusted R2 of 
0.841. Although at first births and deaths were treated separately, the regression on 
the natural increase (which is the number of births minus the deaths) turned out to be 
as good. This population on the other hand, is thought to be joining in the labour 
force as unemployed based on their levels of literacy (as the time spent for education 
increases, the time it takes for them to join the labour force also increases). Again 
based on the level of literacy, people leave the labour force and join back among 
those who cannot work. 
Coming up with a determinant on the number of people not choosing to join in the 
labour force was difficult. Indeed analyses on these figures show that the 
motivations for women and men to join in the labour force differ substantially 
among themselves also depending on whether they are in the towns or in the rural. 
Overall, it seems, the number of women in the labour force in urban areas increases 
as the level of literacy and wages increase (although participation rates are much 
smaller than for women in the rural areas). On the other hand, the more women join 
in the labour force in the towns, the less men opt to work. In the rural on the other 
hand, the level of literacy does not seem to affect the workforce participation rate as 
much, although it does. And indeed, since overall Turkey is becoming more and 
more urban, although workforce participation for women increases both in the rural 
and in the urban, their workforce participation rate seems to drop. As for the men, 
deciding not to work after years of struggle to find work seems to be more 
determinant than anything, although this, to a lesser extent is also valid for women. 
One way to solve this problem could be to partition the whole workforce into four 
segments based on gender and whether the pace is urban or not. But this would bring 
about complications when aggregation would be needed as both work in the same 
sectors. It should also be noted that this would increase complexity in the model. But 
after all, since women make up a half of the population (meaning that the effects on 
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 either of them would be halved overall) and since what increases the workforce 
participation for women does so for men also (and vice versa), with a little 
compromise on the power of the regressions, these were aggregated. The number of 
people who are not active is a function of the number of people unemployed three, 
two years and one year ago (since people give up looking for work after some time), 
level of literacy ( the more people get literate, the more they seem to be getting 
active) and the level of income. Altogether, an adjusted R2 of 0.91 has been reached. 
The number of unemployed people on the other hand is simply the number that 
remains after those who are working in agricultural, manufacturing and services 
sectors is subtracted from the total number of people who are active. 
In the EU, the population is assumed to be divided into non-active, unemployed and 
employed sectors. Based on a birth rate, and an aging rate that takes a fraction of the 
unemployed out of the workforce, the non-active population increases. With a delay, 
on the other hand, the newly born join in the workforce. 
You may see how the population dynamics are displayed on Figure 4.6. 
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Figure 4.6: Stocks and Flows of population 
4.4 Amount of Capital 
4.4.1 Overview  
Amount of capital invested in a sector is taken as to be one of the three basic 
components of a Cobb Douglas production function, the other two being the amount 
of labour and technology. 
Capital Shortage has been one of the prime reasons for the delay in “takeoff” for 
Turkey and especially many Latin American countries. Some theorists have argued 
that borrowing money can be crucial as it translates to increases in capital stock, 
whereas some others stress on the necessity to formulate a way to induce savings 
and their efficient transformation into capital markets. 
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 Solow’s Model (Solow, 1956) for instance, emphasises the importance of 
formulating these savings and transforming them into investments. However, in the 
model, an equilibrium level is assumed to be reached in the end for the capital stock. 
If on the other hand, one is to consider Keynes’ Theory, then, the fact that 
investments would have different multipliers than actual deductions in consumption, 
should imply that taking savings and investments in the same footing may be 
erroneous. However, still, equilibrium levels for savings and for investments can be 
thought upon. 
In real life on the other hand, the amount of savings and investments in an economy 
cannot be expected to be constant or just affecting each other with constant 
Keynesian multipliers. There will always be an outside market, especially in 
Today’s World, and investments can be channelled from outside. 
On the other hand, some key sectors such as tourism may be attracting money from 
outside and hence increasing the overall stock of money within the market, which 
may then be translated into investments. Benette’s article on South Africa for 
instance gives an idea on the multiplier effects of tourism in South Africa. 
Either may be the case, investments are quite crucial in the forming of labour 
demand and production levels. 
In Turkey, capital shortage has been a key element of the economy until 1980’s. The 
tourism industry that started to boom after 80’s, coupled with relative easing of 
capital flows has helped in the formation of capital stock. A similar pattern indeed 
had been observed in the early days of the Republic, this time relying on banks that 
could induce capital accumulation for government investments. (Pamuk, 2001) 
Typically the following ways can be speculated for mechanisms through which 
investments can be done in a country: through government, through foreign capital 
and through internal dynamics of the economy.  
Since it is very difficult to show the mechanisms for capital accumulation, certain 
assumptions had to be made. These are basically that government spending on 
investment constitutes around a fixed level of the budget, that local incentives for 
investment depend on the level of unemployment and evaluation of prices, demand, 
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 productivity and potential demand and that foreign investments will only take place 
if the market seems lucrative enough in its internal dynamics, hampered by some 
barriers that may be due though. Actually for the latter, Kepenek and Yenturk 
(2004) suggest that foreign investments may be directing the flow of investments 
within the domestic capital markets but in such a setting, one would have to give 
more emphasis on global determinants of investments, which is not thoroughly 
modelled in our study. Nevertheless, the very proposition may be used to defend our 
assumption in that there is a correlation between the two. 
Although oversimplified in essence, totally disregarding capital shortages or crisis 
that may take place in the world or changes in the dynamics of other countries, such 
a level of simplification, for the purposes of our model can be deemed satisfactory. 
4.4.2 Modelling the Dynamics 
The amount of capital invested in each of the sectors defines the production levels 
for the sectors.  
It is assumed, in the model, that there are three types of investments (on agriculture, 
on industry and on services) and there is an amount of free capital that can be 
channelled into those. 
Based on the change in prices, and the change in wages in each of the sectors, the 
level of income in the population (signalling how large the market has become) and 
the amount of capital available, investors make a choice on where to channel their 
investments. For the services sector, the level of literacy in the population is also 
thought to signal the demand, hence affecting the investments.  
An amount of capital in each of the sectors expires. The capital accumulation also 
increases as the government decides to increase government expenditures and as the 
amount of foreign investment, which is contingent on the total amount of money 
invested, increases. An amount of the capital accumulated, in each turn, is assumed 
to be channelled to consumption. 
The levels of adjusted R2 are summarised on table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: R2 Values for the Regression of the amount of Capital  
Model R R² Adjusted R² σEstimate 
AgrCapInvTR 0.88 0.78 0.72 0.77 
IndCapInvTR 0.89 0.80 0.74 0.66 
SerCapInvTR 0.95 0.90 0.83 0.54 
 
Government investment, which is determined through the income of the 
government, is also an important factor for increase of capital. 
Apart from the capital that can be generated within the economy, there has been 
assumed to exist also, foreign capital. The amount of foreign capital in the economy 
is thought to be contingent on the overall capital market expansion within the 
economy as well as barriers on trade applied outside the economy. 
The foreign capital flow is bisected into a flow coming from the EU and a flow that 
is stemming from the rest of the world. As far as the EU is concerned on the other 
hand, an amount of the income is thought to be channelled to foreign investments, 
among which a share would choose Turkey. Either way the capital accumulation 
within the economy goes (notice that the level of investments done outside Turkey 
are assumed to be a fixed rate of the already existing levels of investment and the 
level of income), this is thought to be generating a source of income for the economy 
(net factor (capital) income earned abroad). 
You can see the stocks and flows concerning the capital stock on the figure 4.7. 
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Figure 4.7: Stocks and Flows corresponding to Capital Flows 
 
4.5 Education 
4.5.1 Overview 
Education is a very important determinant on the level of development and 
qualification that the country possesses.  
There have been many studies on the role of education in development 
(MacMahon, 1999, Fiske, 1993).   
Barro (1991), using enrolment rates, and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), using 
secondary and higher level educational attainment, Demetriades, Arestis and Kelly 
(1998), Griliches and Regev (1995) using a labour quality index which is based on 
a mix of academic qualifications in the labour force in a study of firm productivity in 
Israeli industry, have found out that there is a correlation between educational 
attainment and productivity. 
Studies show that even primary education may have great payoffs on the economy 
as a whole. 
The reasons vary, basically, a person who can read and write can better 
communicate and get up to date on different stimuli around. This would imply that 
the person in question would overall be prone to multitasking and exposed to 
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 working under different modes as a start. As the education goes deeper, gaining of 
basic analytical tools, finding different areas of application, higher levels of 
awareness may all be counted as ways through which education could affect the 
levels of production. Especially as the level of education increases, intensive training 
may help the people in question get a more through insight into the needs of 
production systems and learn about ways to improve efficiency. Therefore, the level 
of education gives us a level up to which people are able to produce more and hence 
have more options than they otherwise would to work with. This assumption is also 
backed by Gursel et al. (2000). 
The level of education on the other hand, is a proxy for many other factors 
concerning the population. In UN’s HDI indices for instance, educational indicators 
are used as a proxy to show levels of human development. A better educated 
workforce is one that would have more doctors and more aware of preventive 
techniques, hence increasing the level of healthcare, that would produce more 
overall and benefit from a larger variety of products, hence expanding the market 
around itself. Therefore, the level of education is a measure for many indicators of 
human attainment. 
As is the case in Turkey, rising levels of education also affect the growth level of the 
population and increasing diversity in labour. In DPT (2004), the importance of 
having a more qualified labour force is stressed. 
In Classical Cobb Douglas Models, the coefficients on the factors are referred to as 
technology coefficients. The coefficients also give an idea on the marginal 
efficiencies of the factors in question.  
In our model, the technology level is associated with the level of education, although 
possibly breaking it down into more components, such as the infrastructure, R&D 
levels etc. could be more meaningful. Yet, within the confinements of the model, it 
can be assumed that the educational attainment is a proxy for these.  
The level of education on the other hand is contingent on the amount of investment 
done in it up to that point. As every investment, the investment on education expires 
but sets a level for possibilities on offer. The bulk of this investment is traditionally, 
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 either directly or indirectly issued by the government. Therefore in our model, the 
level of investment in education will be assumed to be set by the government. 
4.5.2 Modelling the Dynamics 
Education is given a high level of importance in the model since it indeed can be 
thought of as a proxy to the quality of living that citizens enjoy. 
Various studies have pointed out to the fact that education has non-decreasing (and 
actually positive) returns to scale. One, hence, is expected to gain no less talent after 
three years spent in the university than 3 years spent in the high school and so on. 
Therefore, a crude measure of literacy rate as the ratio of those who can read and 
write is not sufficient. It is more meaningful to have a combination of the number of 
university graduates, the number of high school graduates, the number of technical 
schools graduates, the number of junior high school graduates and the number of 
elementary school graduates was needed. Through this study, various coefficients 
for the given variables were tried. The highest fit with the production indices turned 
out to be achieved through the most intuitive one, which is starting with one for the 
lowest level and incrementing by one for the others. This measure actually roughly 
coincides with the number of years spent to get each of the degrees, although the 
elementary school education is undermined by 60% whereas the university 
education and the technical education are given 50% and 25% more importance 
respectively. However, this is well in tune with the assumption on positive returns to 
scale. 
The data set offered by DIE included the number of students enrolled for each of the 
categories and as well as population with age breakdowns (in groups of 5) at each 
year from 1935 to 2000. It also had the number of graduates for some years. In order 
to come up with the index, for each year, transition (percent of those who have 
graduated and those who are living – the latter is calculated for all the years whereas 
the former was calculated for the period given and extrapolated for the remaining 
years) probabilities from 5 years ago to the next age category in that year were found 
and this was applied on the number of those who have graduated from either of the 
programmes. This value in return, was added on those who had the education by that 
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 year, multiplied with the corresponding coefficients. The basic assumption here is 
that the survival rate for all levels of education. The relative confinement of the 
dataset unfortunately would not allow us to check this. Using this method, a value 
for the weighted literacy for the population is found for each year. The ratio of this 
index to the population on the other hand is assumed to give the literacy index. 
The weighted literacy increases, presumably as the funds to education increases. In 
order to see how an increase in investment in education could affect the index, the 
data set offered by H. Ergen (2004), which was taken from the Finance Ministry of 
Turkey was used, after a cross check with values from the Ministry and the DIE 
dataset. It could be seen that some of the expenditures were channelled to investment 
in education whereas a substantial part of it was used for upkeep. In this study, it 
was assumed that upkeep is expected to be a share of the accumulated investment in 
education. It also is evident that some of the investment in education is bound to 
expire. Therefore, the value of the investment on education was taken as to be a 
weighted average of the total investment up-to-the year in question and the money 
invested for the given year. This investment on the other hand, increases or 
decreases the total level of weighted literacy. The expenses on education are thought 
to constitute a fixed share of the actual budget. (which turns out to be equal to 
around 8 percent of the budget, together with private investments into education) It 
is also assumed that relatively a higher share of funds from the EU will be used for 
education than already decided by the government.  
An adjusted R2 of 0.947 has been reached when the effects of the investments in 
education on the weighted literacy are assessed. 
4.6 Government Expenditures and Revenues 
4.6.1 Overview 
After the crisis of 1920’s, Keynesian theories have stressed the role of government 
spending all the more. Different coefficients applicable on government spending 
would increase the impact that a unit amount of money spent by the government 
would have in the over all economy. The key point though has been the mode of 
financing for these investments. 
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 Governments may basically resort to fiscal or monetary policies to increase their 
revenues. In classical economics, each distortion would have a corresponding 
reaction in the diagrams, with shifting IS-LM curves and even supply levels. 
Governments of course would spend money to the extent that they have some left for 
investment. Basically, governments have common duties such as providing for the 
healthcare and security of its citizens, keeping maintenance and bureaucracy, 
funding welfare projects and so on. As the number of citizens in a country increases 
and the scale of economy expand, so would we expect these to increase. 
To finance these expenses though, there are various taxes and duties that the 
government may be expected to impose. Each tax increase though hurts the local 
economy in that it causes the markets to clear at lower levels. 
When the budget falls short of covering government expenses, to the extent that their 
credit ratings allow, governments choose to increase their debts. The more 
outstanding loans that they have, with respect to their assets, the less would be their 
credit rating and their allowances to take out loans. Each loan on the other hand, 
brings more burden on the government and more loans are taken to finance for the 
old ones usually. On the other hand, a vicious circle forms as governments get more 
dependent on loans and lose their credit ratings and as higher interest rates get levied 
on them. This way, a system of ever increasing amount of loans is formed. 
Through the EU harmonisation phase, in order to meet the Maastricht criteria, 
Turkey is expected to lower its indebtedness significantly, below 60% of its GNP. 
Within the system though, some mechanisms should start to substitute for the 
mentioned vicious circle in order for this criterion to be met. 
4.6.2 Modelling the Dynamics 
In order to keep the model simple, the government expenditures were assumed to be 
composed of operational expenses, interest and debt payment and investments. 
Operational expenses are thought to be proportional to the expenses on education 
and on population. Again a function that is comparable to the Cobb-Douglas was 
used to estimate this value. The model fit (adjusted R2) has been 0.939.  
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 The interest and debt payments on the other hand are related to the debt stock of the 
government. 
Meanwhile, the revenues of the government are determined through direct and 
indirect taxes from domestic production, consumption and custom duties as well as 
from funds allocated from the EU. The tax rates for each of the groups were taken 
from the OECD.  
Whenever the government expenditures exceed revenues, the government is 
expected to take out a loan. The amount of this loan in practice cannot exceed a 
certain credit quota imposed on the government. An index based on the amount of 
debt the government pays every year and the ratio of the total GNP to the debt stock 
for our model was assumed to set this credit quota. If the government fails to get this 
credit, it is reflected on the expenses and especially on the investment in education.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Stocks and Flows Corresponding to the Government’s Budget 
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 4.7 Immigration 
4.7.1 Overview 
Immigration is one of the most thorny issues when relations between Turkey and the 
EU are considered. Some critiques suggest that the main reason for the troubles over 
the membership stem from the fear of migrants that could come from Turkey. 
Due to its geographic proximity, EU countries have traditionally had high attire on 
the Turks. Added to this should be the high level of involvement of Turkey with 
these countries, and high level of exposure that is embedded within the culture, the 
EU, and Germany in particular have been top destinations for Turkish emigrants, 
especially after mutual labour force export agreements signed in 1961, in line with 
shortage of labour in Germany and economic plan in Turkey that sought to benefit 
from workers remittances (İçduygu and Sirkeci, 1998). 
There are many reasons for immigration that usually have to do with the pull effects 
of the destinations and the push effects of the countries of origin. Widely mentioned 
in the literature are differentials in standard of living (that can be indexed at levels of 
per capita income and literacy for instance), lack of stability and security (Taran, 
1999) and perceptions. 
Of course, labour mobility is not totally free of burdens. There are pecuniary and 
non pecuniary costs of moving, and they may not all be seen at once. Some of them 
are rather evident. EU countries for instance, are imposing visa regulations on 
Turkish citizens to keep migration in track. Regular border checks, laws against 
migration all constitute barriers on migration between the countries. 
Even if all these barriers are removed though, there will remain a substantial amount 
of barriers as Belot, M and Ederveen, S. (2004) suggest. These are cultural barriers, 
transaction costs for movement, the breaking of networks etc. 
The migration from Turkey to present EU countries has mainly taken place during 
the 60’s and 70’s. This was a period when barriers on immigration between the 
(present day) EU countries and Turkey were eased, due to high labour demand from 
these countries. However, as these barriers were gradually increased, the numbers on 
migration have fallen. 
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 However, most of these new barriers were the ones imposed by governments this 
time. Due to a higher amount of Turkish labour stock and greater exposure on the 
countries, non-institutional barriers on immigration would be expected to ease. 
Nevertheless, although the change in income differentials has also been a case, the 
fall in the number of migrants was certain and definitive. 
There have been many attempts to model immigration. Some were more theoretical ( 
like the Job Search Model and Harris Todaro Model), whereas some have been more 
empirical (like Belot, M and Ederveen, S.,  2004; Sirkeci, 2001). 
Some of the parameters that were taken in consideration in the bulk of these models 
have been the levels of per capita income (used as a proxy to differentials in welfare 
and comfort), literacy levels (since higher the level of education, the less would be, 
at least in theory, psychological barriers imposed on immigration- based on the 
belief that literacy eases adaptation to different cultures (İçduygy et. al, 2001) 
(Herwatz 2002)) and unemployment (since judging by the Job Search Model for 
instance, an unemployed person would be expected to lose less in terms of 
opportunity costs while moving out. To that one could add the distress on the 
unemployed). 
Through our model, up to 75% of the initial barriers on migration between Turkey 
and the EU will be assumed to be coming from institutional barriers. Therefore, even 
when these barriers are to be removed, only gradually could one be expected to 
observe a decline in a portion of the barriers since they are not imposed by the 
governments.  
The benefits and burden that immigration could bring on countries, on the other 
hand, for instance has been studied in OECD Economic Outlook (2001). It is clear 
that, although net influx of labour does put pressure on wages, there can be an 
optimal level of immigration that sets the economy better off. 
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4.7.2 Modelling the Dynamics 
Immigration is one of the most important issues between Turkey and the EU. There 
are no clear figures o the number of people who have migrated from Turkey but 
Bulutay (1995) offers some statistics on the stock of Turkish population outside 
Turkey. EUROSTAT on the other hand, for some countries gives the stock of 
labour. The change in the stock of labour in return cannot be totally taken as the 
number of immigrants from the place since the stock itself passes on to new 
generations and increases by itself. Birth and death rates for them though are not 
available. To this end, estimates based on reasonable population increase figures that 
should be in between the values for Turkey and for the EU are thought to be 
appropriate. The remaining value was regressed on the per capita income of Turkey 
and the EU as well as the level of literacy and the populations in each of the 
countries and the unemployment rates. The level of literacy here was used, since a 
level of literacy actually makes people more aware and willing to move and eases 
the barriers on migration. 
On the other hand, there are some visible and non visible barriers on immigration 
that can range from formalities imposed by host countries to distance and other costs 
of moving. The total demand for migration is assumed to be hampered by these 
barriers.  
The overall adjusted R2 turned out to be 93%. 
 
4.8 Trade 
4.8.1 Overview 
Limitations to internal markets set the boundaries for development at a lower 
equilibrium for closed economies, as classical economists argue.  
Increased levels of trade between countries not only increase welfare within the 
states but also help in the founding of a sustainable environment on which 
development would be expected to take place. It has been proposed that larger trade 
volumes bring higher levels of growth. (Ades, and Glaeser, 1999) 
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 EU countries, due to their large economies and proximity, as well as historic ties, 
have traditionally made up for the majority of Turkish trade. This has been quite a 
determinant issue in Turkey ever wanting to join in the EU and indeed forming a 
Customs Union with the EU. 
Trade has many faces and impacts. Indeed, a study of input output ratios may give 
an idea of how trading of certain items, or the easing of some forms of trade may 
boost certain sectors within the economy. 
However, trade liberalisation is not always considered as an effective policy measure 
by everyone. So far as the infant industry argument and anti-liberals are concerned, 
immature levels of local industry, when opened up to high levels of competition in a 
global economy that would not allow for any equitable distribution  of absolute 
advantages, may cause to form another form of exploitation for the host economy. 
Some on the other hand argue that even in such a setting law of comparative 
advantages would step in and eventually growth in certain sectors would trigger 
growth in others. 
As far as the Customs Union with the EU is concerned, debates revolve around the 
increased levels of exports versus and even greater increase in imports (although not 
so, comparatively speaking) 
Either way the arguments go, trade is dominated by a supply side, a demand side, 
and production levels and prices that set in, even though the markets clear or not. 
In our model, we have tried to find some possible functions that could be dominating 
the relations between these factors as well as potentials for them.  
4.8.2 Modelling the Dynamics 
Trade is evaluated in three segments, in line with the production functions. These are 
agriculture, services and manufacturing goods trade.  
The amounts for the trade on services were obtained from the WTO, for Turkey and 
for the EU, starting from 1980. These figures were cross checked with possible 
proxies available on DIE dataset and by EUROSTAT. The trade on agriculture, as 
proposed in EUROSTAT’s dataset is assumed to include SITC (Standard 
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 International Trade Classification) groups 0 and 1 and the trade on manufactured 
goods was taken to include the groups 2 to 8. For each of the groups it is possible to 
obtain the trade between Turkey and the EU and EU with RoW from EUROSTAT. 
As for the trade Turkey is involved in, DIE offers data in given classifications. In all 
cases, the dataset was checked with the figures offered by WTO. 
For each of the demand types (like for manufactured goods from Turkey to the EU- 
there are in total 18 such types based on whether it is an export from Turkey or the 
EU or the RoW to which of the other two and on product group), the amount is 
determined based on the demand for the goods, relative price indices, production 
levels and the barriers on trade.   
For the trade on services, an adjusted R2 of 0.968 in the case of imports, and of 
adjusted R2 of 0.948 in the case of exports has been observed. As for the agriculture, 
the corresponding figures are at 0.702 and 0.765 respectively. In the case of 
industrial goods, on the other hand, they are at 0.867 and 0.898. 
In all product groups, both for Turkey and the EU, demands for each of the products 
are calculated, based on regressions for domestic consumption (which is production 
minus the exports plus the imports) for each of the items on the total disposable 
income and level of literacy of the country. The total disposable income is 
considered to be the money remaining from taxes, a share of government 
expenditures and used capital. The preferences for consumption seem to be 
contingent on the level of literacy (more educated classes are argued to have a higher 
demand for services) and the income itself at an adjusted R2 level of 0.991. 
The prices (in Turkey) on the other hand are thought to depend on the domestic and 
international demand for the goods (from the classical theory of economics) as well 
as on the total amount of disposable income, since after all price hikes in a country 
do propagate.  The demand is segregated into exports and imports since they may be 
affecting the prices in different fashions. As for prices in the EU and in the RoW, a 
fixed level of inflation was assumed based on past data. On formulating the 
regressions in all cases, the inflation figures on industry were available on 
EUROSTAT (for the EU), CENSUS-FEDSTATS (for the RoW) and DIE (for 
Turkey) databases. For the agricultural products, on the other hand, only indices on 
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 wheat, barley etc. were available in the databases, although in EUROSTAT and DIE 
the mentioned index was available for a few years. In order for the figures to be 
comparable, a proxy index based on the mentioned prices was formulated. The lack 
of any index on services made us use the CPI instead. Levels of adjusted R2 for the 
prices in industry, agriculture and in services are at 0.968, 0.904, 0.895 respectively. 
The values for the barriers from Turkey to the RoW and from the EU to the rest of 
the world were taken from the WTO. WTO also offers an estimate for the non-tax-
based barriers on trade. Since Turkey and the EU are in customs union, except for 
agricultural products, only the non-tax-based barriers can be assumed to be 
applicable in these sectors. As for agriculture on the other hand, rates applicable to 
the rest of the world are used. 
The level of imports and exports on the other hand are assumed to be subject to 
different levels of taxation and affect the purchasing power in their own ways, hence 
incorporated into the corresponding functions. 
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Figure 4.9: Representation of trade in either of the sectors 
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4.9 Testing for the Validity of the Model 
One basic deficiency while testing for the validity of the model arose due to lack of 
sufficient data points. It so happens that the data at hand, gathered from different 
periods of time, only coincide for 5 years of time span between the EU and Turkey. 
Even then, for some of the data points there is not enough coverage. In order to 
avoid this problem, we have segregated the model into subcomponents where we 
could carry the test, giving all the values as they are for the remaining ones (as 
assumed graphical functions based on data where found, extrapolation otherwise). 
Data presumably generated around 91% correlation for the population, 86% for 
production and again 90% for the literacy. However, these results were hardly 
unexpected, given that they rely on regressions that befit on similar levels of 
correlation. Therefore, it is only logical that once all the other parameters are fed 
into the model, the model generates outcomes that are on par, at given levels of 
power. 
The model was put under extreme values test under a variety of options.  
In the first case, the rate of growth for the EU was thought to be doubled. In such a 
setting, per capita GNP of the EU is expected to rise much faster and it is expected 
that this should affect Turkey also, due to links between the economies. This effect 
should be greater if ties between the parties are stronger. 
It turned out that, in such a setting, the increase in income for the EU is 200% of 
what it would have been. That is quite as expected since the effects have propagated 
over the time horizon. The change in the GNP per capita values for Turkey have 
been at 3% in the base scenario, 12% in the scenario where the barriers are gradually 
removed. Again this is in conformity with our hypothesis. This scenario is also 
expected to cause the Turkish trade deficit with the EU by 20%, which again is quite 
reasonable. 
In a second test, the growth rate for all of the sectors of production in the EU has 
been left as 0. The logical result is that the unemployment figures in the EU will soar 
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 and the change in per capita income will be very small. Less migrants should choose 
to move to the EU since they cannot find work. 
In such a setting, it was observed that, the total stock of Turkish population within 
the EU is expected to be 5% less in the base scenario. Indeed, net reverse migration 
is observed in the end. The total per capita income in the EU is expected to rise by 
4% of its original value, just because the international and the Turkish demand will 
boost it. The Turkish GNP per capita is expected to go beyond that of the EU by th 
29th year, but still be 8% less than what it would have been. The total Turkish trade 
deficit may as well go down. In the scenario where the trade barriers are dropped on 
the other hand, the EU per capita income may go up a little and in total a million less 
migrants are expected, with more people as net migrating to Turkey in the last half a 
decade. The effects on the Turkish economy though would be 15% less. 
In a third test, the population growth rate is thought to be kept constant. It is logical 
to think that in such a case, the unemployment rate would go up, the income per 
capita will decrease and the literacy rate will decrease. In such a setting, it turns out 
that the population may just as well reach 118 million and the per capita income may 
lie low at around 56% of what it would have been. The unemployment rate may 
increase by one and a half times. The literacy rate may be 10% less than what it 
would be and the activity rate may drop. The budget deficit reaches more than 100% 
of the income and is unsustainable. The drop in unemployment that is observed in 
the base scenario does not take place.  
All these results are logically valid. Therefore, our model can respond to such 
changes well enough. 
Stella®’s built-in verification-validation mechanism on the other hand, resulted in 
100% inner consistency for the model. 
After all, validation was incorporated into the building process of our model. 
Therefore, the regressions were re-evaluated, substantially changed and re-changed 
until the mentioned adjusted R2 levels were reached. Therefore these results are not 
very surprising. Since our model is not strictly a systems dynamics model, and 
indeed more based on equations derived from regressions, the only way through 
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 which validation could fail, could be through error propagation between the 
regressions. However, in order to test for that, sub-models need to be extended. 
Moreover, error propagation actually becomes an issue as the time span increases, 
since error propagates year-on-year. So there may be two sources of error 
propagation, one due to the model fits within the model, the other due to the time 
span. In the sub-models we have tested, the lack of fit was obviously more due to the 
extrapolations and assumptions we had for the remaining variables, since regression 
results gave evidence on the fit. Nevertheless, these assumptions were not very far 
from the reality, as it seems. In order to have an idea on the possible error 
propagation within the model, the following may be useful:  
Considering Adjusted R2 levels and the fact that they are highly interconnected, if 
we take each of these values as probabilities that the results will be logical and that 
all equal sub-groups of the model that the regression is based on, have an equal 
effect on the outcomes, one would expect a combined Adjusted R2 value of 36% 
(simply by multiplying Adjusted R2 averages within the groups. Of course, in such a 
setting, the results could be rendered less viable but their effects are not independent, 
given the highly knit network. 
On the other hand, if we take the minimum of the Adjusted R2 values obtained, this 
is 62%, which is not very bad for social sciences. The highest Adjusted R2 value 
attained turned out to be 99.1%. 
As another measure, if we resort to taking the average of all Adjusted R2 values, a 
value of 84% is reached. 
Therefore, the model validation results, in the presence of data should be lying 
between these values.   
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 5. THE BASE SCENARIO 
When all funds that could be received from the EU, together with all unpredictable 
potential changes in the global markets are ignored and the model is run to see the 
course of development that Turkey will observe, the following results are obtained. 
The population of the country will most probably grow at a decreasing rate and will 
reach an equilibrium at around 88.7 million around 2022 and remain there. This 
result is consistent with the estimates of DPT (2004) that set it around 90million. 
The labour participation rate in the population can be expected to grow very briefly, 
with more people, most probably especially women will decide to join the workforce 
considering rising levels of literacy and income. The number of non active people 
may be expected to drop by more than 30% until 2010’s in absolute figures, 
although in the mean time, the population itself will be increasing. However, as has 
been the case in Spain, this rise in labour participation will most probably not be met 
by the demand for labour. Of course to this structural problem, one should add the 
fact that the labour supply that reaches maturity, unlike in Spain will not be constant 
in the given period.  
We can see that the demand for labour in the agricultural sector will drop 
consistently. On the other hand, the demand for labour in the manufacturing 
industry, which is expected to be the fastest growing in relative terms in the period) 
will not have grown by more than 40% until that time. The demand in the services 
industry on the other hand seems to be growing around 30%. All in all, the increase 
in demand for labour will not be as much as in the increase in labour supply.   When 
the whole time horizon is concerned on the other hand, the increase in jobs in the 
industrial and services sectors may be expected to be more than twice as much as the 
natural increase, although the increase in agricultural labour demand can be expected 
drop substantially. Overall, the labour participation rate is expected to increase by 6 
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 points, which means an overall increase in the number of employed with respect to 
the unemployed.  
The shortage of jobs in the market can be expected with a stress piling up from this 
time, to push some people out of the job market. This means that the participation 
figures in the labour force will start declining back again, although this time due to 
the fact that people will grow out of looking for jobs instead of family related 
reasons. From 2016, the increase in the rates of participation in the labour force can 
be expected to give way to a decline, repeating a pattern that would be observed half 
a decade ago. In absolute numbers, on the other hand, the number of non-active 
people may be expected to grow in two trends, from 2009 and from 2016. However, 
the number of people out of the labour force will decline back again from mid-
2020’s, especially with the lack of pressure from workers coming from below. 
As more people will remain out of the workforce, the number of unemployed people 
may be expected to start coming down. An absolute decrease in the rates of 
unemployment though should not be expected any earlier than around 2020.  
Emigration from Turkey can be expected to remain around similar values, assuming 
that the immigration regimes will not be eased.  However, since there already is a 
substantial amount of Turkish population available in the union, until 2030’s, the 
number of Turkish citizens may be expected to increase by more than a quarter, 
when the natural increase and additional migration from Turkey are considered at 
once. 
In the economy overall, the GNP per head is expected to rise by seven folds. With 
these figures, the average income of a Turkish citizen may be expected to near a half 
of the EU average, whereas the ratio today is around one to six-seven.  
This increase will mostly stem from booms in the industrial and services sectors, 
which may be expected to have up to 30 and 16 times more wealth generated than 
today. The increase in value added in the agricultural sector in the mean time is 
expected to be around four times. In all cases, the real momentum for growth may be 
expected to come around mid 2010’s. 
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 As an aggregate, the increase in GNP is expected to near ten folds, which means that 
Turkey may find itself in the first 15 economies of the world. 
As far as foreign trade is concerned one may expect that Turkey will have a 1200 per 
cent increase in service exports, where as the demand for services exports is not 
expected to rise by more than 300%. Turkey already has a surplus in this domain. 
Therefore, its trade surplus is expected to rise even more. The rise itself, in both 
parts, will boom after 2010’s, almost showing an equilibrium until then.  
In the manufacturing sector, the demand for imports will rise at over eight folds, 
which is lower than the increase in exports. However, since the base level of the 
imports is higher than the exports, the gap between the exports and the imports 
should not be expected to shrink in absolute terms. 
The share of the EU in Turkish foreign trade may go up to 65% from its current 
57%.  The rise in trade for services is expected to be similar to those in the 
international trade at large. Presumably, the dominance of the European in trade in 
services is expected to be maintained. 
The trade on agriculture is expected to rise between the EU and Turkey at a very 
high pace, especially when imports are concerned. The level is expected to stabilise 
towards the end. Exports on the other hand may be expected to stumble and even 
decrease in mid-2010’s, but will recuperate in the end. 
Both the exports and the imports in the manufacturing sector are expected to rise by 
around 13 folds with the EU. This though, means that the deficit will get larger, 
since the terms of trade are in EU’s favour. 
Overall, the Turkish deficit is expected to first go down for half a decade but will 
rise back and surpass current levels. As with the EU on the other hand, the fall in 
deficit may last slightly longer but eventually the deficit will be even higher. In the 
end, the deficit with the EU and the general deficit will have both grown by 5 folds. 
Imports substitution rate on the other hand will rise even faster. 
The agricultural sector is expected to rise steadily although at a lower pace. The rise 
in imports is expected to be much higher than the increase in exports, since overall 
the agricultural sector is expected to enter a phase of relative decline 
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 Wages in industry are expected to rise by 10 times whereas the corresponding 
increase in the services sector may go beyond 13 times. The relative wages between 
the services and the industry will be in the services sectors’ absolute superiority, 
starting from late 2010’s. The reason for this should be sought in the heavy 
dependence in the services sector over qualified workforce. Therefore, as literacy 
rates in the country rise substantially, so would the wages in services. However, the 
wages in the agricultural sector are expected to rise less than the national average, 
hence indeed causing a wider income gap. 
The average years of schooling, which is represented by our literacy index is 
expected to increase by more than 150% in the given period. This implies almost 
100% literacy rate, together with a high degree of schooling in higher education. 
The debt stock is expected to decline for some period at a low pace. However, 
especially after 2020’s, it may be expected to rise quite fast. Nevertheless, the ratio 
of the debt stock to the GNP is expected to lie around 10%, which is an acceptable 
level.  
The results are summarised on Table 5.1. 
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 Table 5.1: Projected values until 2032 in the base scenario 
 2008 2014 2020 2026 2032 
Ratio of Services 0.45 0.49 0.51 0.52 0.53 
Ratio of Industry 0.3 0.35 0.38 0.41 0.42 
Foreigninvestments 2736367 3149972 3508736 3789032 3895172 
Unemployment Rate 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.05 
Workforce participation Rate 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.81 
Cannot Work 35591089 38853191 38697932 39222688 40616759 
Non-active 7900981 8607359 9492568 9788768 9291156 
Unemployed 8215670 7587675 7813097 6104840 3231252 
Agricultural Employment 5710929 4198058 3085958 2268463 1667529 
Manufacturing Employment 6816493 8957505 11356000 13532213 15023367 
Services Employment 10437094 12687310 15085805 17262018 18753173 
Immigration from TR to EU 32.06 34.73 36.72 37.86 24.89 
Agr. Imports from the EU 3.53 7.28 10.39 12.59 29.88 
Demand for Agricultural Products TR 84.26 140.25 204.72 284.43 528.18 
Demand for Manufactured Goods TR 268.62 430.99 691.85 1207.25 2351.9 
Deemand for Services TR 334.21 515.63 798.78 1355.32 2591.61 
Agr. Exports to the EU 3.99 7.67 15.04 29.26 53.99 
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 Table 5.1: Projected values until 2032 in the base scenario (continued) 
 2008 2014 2020 2026 2032 
Manuf. Exports to the EU 90.1 162.7 299.14 576.78 1175.24 
Manuf. Imports from the EU 223.84 442.99 716 1216.15 2276.46 
TotalinEu 3200069 3419118 3653943 3900099 4152158 
Total Agricultural Imports TR 18.65 53.97 85.74 99.96 302.61 
GNP TR  309.29 466.58 719.00 1193.57 2231.22 
Investmentsfromthe EU 946321 1089403 1213583 1310711 1347750 
GNP per head EU 27025.08 31719.62 37151.5 43469.79 50730.13 
GNP per head TR 4141.91 5767.96 8406.31 13535.8 25187.83 
Total Agricultural Prod. TR 34.65 44.32 58.56 80 113.23 
Total Industrial Prod. TR 154.45 278.92 512.82 988.76 2014.7 
Total Services Prod. TR 218.7 360.1 639.37 1223.91 2509.64 
Services Exports to EU 58.01 115.83 230.95 414.47 660.68 
Services Imports from EU 47.31 61.22 79.46 110.05 163.71 
Total Services Exports 59.93 119.97 241.48 444.7 754.35 
Total Services Imports 60.51 83.7 114.55 161.33 235.24 
Total Agricultural Exports 23.95 20.68 24.88 37.23 59.11 
Total Manufacturing Imports 302.59 522.76 866.86 1538.42 2955.92 
Total Manufacturing Exports 102.97 185.95 341.88 659.18 1343.13 
Total Population 74672255 80891097 85531360 88178991 88583236 
debtStock 68.39 31.76 138.83 276.34 468.34 
Trade Deficit -194.91 -333.83 -458.92 -658.6 -1337.17 
Budget Deficit -107.43 -124.87 -327.11 -473.87 -392.62 
Avg Years of Schooling TR 3.81 4.51 5.46 6.81 8.72 
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6. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS 
In order to see how much changing circumstances that could be observed in the 
future might affect the given course that we have drawn, we have designated a 
couple of possible policies. 
In each of the policies designated, all other conditions are considered to be 
remaining constant.  
6.1 Descriptions of the Scenarios 
There are seven scenarios. One of them is an eventual membership scenario. Five of 
them consider the effects of individual policies that may be adopted through the 
membership scenario and one is based on dynamics within the economy, 
notwithstanding the EU.  
6.1.1 Barriers on Immigration Dropped Instantly 
One of the hottest topics concerning Turkey’s membership in the EU revolves 
around the possible number of migrants that could flood to European countries. In 
this scenario, the barriers imposed on immigration are assumed to be dropped 
instantaneously, starting from 2006. Presumably, not all of the barriers can be 
dropped at once (Belot, M and Ederveen, S., 2004). Therefore, the barriers to be 
dropped in question have to be the ones imposed by the governments. Considering 
that some of the inherent barriers are already implicitly covered within the model 
structure, the barriers imposed by governments cannot be more than 70% of the 
barriers overall. On the other hand, it has been discussed that migration is eased as 
more and more people get settled in a country. Moreover, as policies shift and 
barriers become obsolete, the pace at which psychological barriers are removed will 
be faster also. Therefore a substantial amount of the remaining part of the barriers 
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 would be reduced gradually over the time, at around 2% of the initial levels per year. 
The bulk of the migration is expected to take in the first years.  
Such a policy would be expected to increase the per capita income and efficiency in 
Turkey, removing an unemployed population out of Turkey. This would ease the 
weight on the labour markets in Turkey. The effects though would be expected to be 
the opposite for the EU. However, since the barriers on immigration also affect the 
barriers on foreign investments, the effects of this decline may be partially offset by 
net factors of income earned abroad by the EU. 
6.1.2 Barriers on Immigration Dropped Gradually 
In this scenario, the barriers imposed on immigration are assumed to be dropped 
gradually, starting from 2006, at around 2-3 percent of the initial level. Such a policy 
would be expected to yield in results comparable to the previous scenario. However, 
the effects are spanned over a longer time horizon and most probably would be 
better balanced. Overall, less people albeit possibly not too much less, are expected 
to migrate.  
6.1.3 Funds are Allowed 
The EU is criticised for not allowing the funds that are promised to Turkey, from the 
Customs Union Agreement. Although this is partially matched on the Turkish side 
with reservations on other requirements, the case would most probably be different 
for the funds reserved for Turkey’s accession in the EU. It has been decided by the 
EU, to allocate around 10 billion dollars to Turkey for pre-accession. This fund, 
being much less in relative terms when compared with the funds that were available 
to new entrants, is still a substantial amount. 
In this scenario, an annual amount of money is expected to be given to Turkey, 
adding up to an estimate of 10 billion dollars in 10 years as proposed in the EU 
budget. This amount corresponds to an approximate 0.1 % of the whole GDP of the 
EU. The transformative effects on the Turkish economy are expected to spill over 
especially with increases in education. On the European Union side on the other 
hand, livening up in the Turkish economy may be translated into higher levels of 
imports in particular and trade in general, which could also ease foreign investments 
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 channelled into the EU, meaning higher levels of income earned abroad for the EU 
as well. 
As far as the funds are concerned, a relatively higher share of the funds are assumed 
to be allocated to education, since most of the funds are structural in essence and 
since in our model, education is taken as a proxy to many infrastructural needs. (The 
Representation of the EU Commission in Turkey- www.deltur.cec.eu.int ) 
6.1.4 Funds to Turkey Increased 
In this scenario, the amount of funds available to Turkey is thought to be doubled. 
This scenario takes on the belief that the budget can be revised in the EU as demand 
for pre-accession increase. This may help us see the marginal benefit of extra funds 
to be allowed on the European side. 
6.1.5 Trade Regimes Harmonised 
Turkey is in Customs Union with the EU. However, the Customs Union in question 
is not a perfect one. Turkey has expressed its reservations on the suitability of its 
agricultural markets and has decided to keep high levels of duties on these items. 
The level of import duties on agricultural products is still less, as WTO figures 
suggest, then the rates applied to non-EU countries but still they are higher than the 
levels imposed by the EU on third countries.  
Moreover, the parties to the agreement have not yet fully harmonised their tax 
barriers on products coming from third countries, although a gradual transition is 
foreseen in the agreements. 
In this scenario, the customs union agreement with the EU is thought to be extended 
over all sectors .The barriers on trade vis-à-vis third countries are assumed to be 
harmonised at European levels and the barriers in between are though to be reduced 
to the minimum of the non-trade barriers (which is less than half of the levels 
applicable now). This scenario may help us see what the effects of an extended 
customs union agreement could be on Turkey. Some to this end suggest that the 
results could be cataclysmic whereas some would believe that free trade helps all the 
parties concerned. The effects of the Customs Union, which have been mostly 
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 positive may give us an intuition but it should also be remembered that since 
Customs Union is already in practice over majority of domains and since agriculture 
has relatively less importance, the effects could be limited. 
6.1.6 Investment on Education Increased 
Proponents of internal development theories (Romer, 1986), hold that the real 
factors on development come from within, especially through education. Although 
our model is specifically designed to reflect changes concerning the integration 
process within the EU, we wanted to have a base model to see to what extent 
dynamics within can be manipulated to yield in what kind of results.  
In our model, the basic policy mechanisms through which the government can act in 
the local market are given as investments in education, investments overall and tax 
rates. In order to be inline with internal development theory, we wanted to choose 
the type of intervention that aims at increasing the level of education, and in a subtle 
way, infrastructure. To this end, the funds allocated to education are assumed to be 
doubled.  
The low levels of funds allocated to education are often criticised in Turkey. 
Through this scenario, we aim at monitoring if these effects would indeed offset 
other expectations that Turkey may be in, from the EU. 
6.1.7 A Possible Membership Scenario 
Turkey’s future will most probably be determined through the course that 
membership may take on. A possible European Union membership will definitely be 
a breaking point in Turkish history in many respects. 
As far as our study is concerned, we have been aiming at monitoring possible 
impacts that this membership may have on Turkish Markets. Although overall, the 
effects are expected to be positive, they should be well compared with base 
scenarios at hand, as well as possible different setting that can be. 
Possible changes that can be observed during the accession span over a large domain 
from CAP to immigration control mechanisms. However, considering the limited 
scope of our model, we have decided to include harmonisation in tax regimes, pre-
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 accession and post-accession funds and smoothening of the trade barriers and their 
eventual dropping out. 
Therefore, in this scenario, possible effects of a probable membership in 2014 are 
evaluated. In such a setting, trade barriers outside Turkey are assumed to be dropped 
to EU levels. The barriers between Turkey and the EU on the other hand are reduced 
to levels mentioned in the previous scenario. The funds allocated to Turkey are 
assumed to double after the membership and the bans on migration are assumed to 
drop at around 1% of the initial levels until two years after the time of membership, 
when the barriers are halved (as was the case with Greece, Portugal, Spain and now , 
two years after their accession, is being discussed for the new members-although for 
Turkey this may take longer) and then dropping back again at a rate that is one an a 
half times as fast. Through this scenario, combined effects are hoped to be reflected. 
Since the last scenario is different in essence from the other ones in that it allows for 
various policies to be used at once, the first six scenarios will be evaluated together 
and the last scenario will be evaluated in its own respect. 
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6.2 Evaluation of the First Six Scenarios  
6.2.1 Investments 
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Figure 6.1: Total Amount of Foreign Investments 
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Figure 6.2: Total Amount of Investments from the EU 
As can be seen in both graphs, the amount of foreign investments in Turkey will 
depend on these policies. 
In all graphs, a stable increase in investments is visible. Although a gradual decline 
in the level of increase for the investments can be seen, this may be due to the 
absorption capacity of the economy for foreign investments. 
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 The relative positioning of the scenarios is relatively stable over time. 
Harmonisation of trade regimes is always on the lead, followed by a large margin, 
by the removal of barriers suddenly. Gradual removal of the barriers on the other 
hand matches up with the other option that offers reduction in barriers, quite soon. 
When it comes to total amount of foreign investment channelled into the country 
from the EU, although in the beginning the option that involves sudden dropping of 
barriers on immigration seems to be offering the highest amount of such 
possibilities, the lead is soon taken by the harmonization in trade regimes, on a close 
mark-up by the scenario that involves gradual dropping of the barriers. The 
remaining scenarios all seem to be offering similar levels of attraction for foreign 
capital, with the options that involve funding and investment in education going in 
the front.  
The reason why these patterns are observed has to do with the fact that barriers on 
foreign trade are though to be proportional to the barriers imposed on trade and 
migration. Therefore, it is logical that the level of foreign investment must increase 
as these barriers are lifted. With low levels of trade barriers, as for instance is (or at 
least was) the case in textiles in Turkey, nearby investors may choose to invest in the 
country that is exempt from additional duties upon export, given that the wages in 
the country in question will be less. Similarly, the easing of the barriers on 
immigration allow for more direct contacts between the countries and room for 
workers’ remittances to be channelled to investment.  
Among the policies, the highest discrepancy is around 94%, in favour of the 
harmonized trade regimes.  The average disparity between the maximum and the 
minimum of the data set is around 65%. The corresponding figures for investments 
from the EU are at 101% and 76% respectively. 
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6.2.2 Immigration  
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Figure 6.3: Number of migrants from Turkey to the EU 
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Figure 6.4: Total Stock of Turkish Population in the EU 
The amount of people that would choose to move from Turkey to the EU in different 
settings differs substantially. 
The scenario where the barriers are removed at once results in the highest number of 
migrants from the very start. One thing to notice here though is that, despite the fact 
that barriers do get less and less over the time, the number of migrants reduces from 
one year to another by in total more than 65%, although still more than three times 
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 the figures in the base scenario. In total, 3.5 million more people may move from 
Turkey to EU countries if such a policy is followed. 
In the case where barriers are removed gradually, every drop in barriers seems to 
attract all the more immigrants. This largely is because those who are willing to, will 
not have had the opportunity to move in early stages. In this scenario, the number of 
migrants annually may increase by more than 7 times, which may be a problem for 
the EU. However, in this setting, 650 thousand people will have moved less. 
In all of the remaining scenarios, the numbers of people that are expected to move 
are almost the same. However, the scenarios on increasing the funds allowed and 
increasing the investments in education result in up to 17% and 10% falls per year 
and declining at a faster rate. In all, in these settings, 0.04% will have moved less. 
If all the barriers are withdrawn, the population stock of Turkish citizens living in 
EU countries would be expected to more than double itself, together with the rates of 
natural increase.  
It may be concluded that without any other policy backing, sheer removal of barriers 
in between would not stop migration easily and since this would mean a decrease in 
the per capita GDP of the EU, EU would have no incentive to pursue such a policy. 
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6.2.3 Unemployment 
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Figure 6.5: The number of unemployed people in Turkey 
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
20
14
20
16
20
18
20
20
20
22
20
24
20
26
20
28
20
30
20
32
Base Scenario
Barriers
dropped
instantly
f unds to TR
increased
barriers
dropped
gradually
Higher
Inv estment in
Education
trade regimes
harmonised
f unds to TR
allowed
 
Figure 6.6: The unemployment rate in Turkey 
In all given scenarios, both the number of unemployed and the unemployment rates 
first rise and then, after reaching relative stagnation and slight decline, start rising 
again until when they start falling. 
The break around 2008 may be due to the fact that by that time, falling rates of 
increase in participation rates may be allowing for employment opportunities to 
catch up for the unemployed. By 2016 though, signals given to the non-active 
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 population are calling for more people in, once more forcing on the unemployment 
rates, albeit slightly. 
Presumably, the lowest unemployment rates are observed in the scenarios that allow 
for a higher degree of labour mobility. In these scenarios, high levels of 
unemployment forces many people out of the labour market in Turkey, to the EU 
where possibly employment opportunities are higher. The high amounts of shifts in 
the labour force, allow for more space in the domestic market and the unemployment 
rates may as well be expected to fall behind their current levels. 
On the other hand, again the policies that favour investment in education and higher 
allocation of funds would help in reducing unemployment rates by at least one point. 
The increase in funds and investment presumably allow for the education of the 
labour force, hence boosting their economic potential and demand for their talent. 
They also help in accumulating higher levels of capital stock to invest in various 
sectors, duly boosting the demand for labour among them. 
Overall, the unemployment rates can be reduced by up to 2 points, and about 11% 
off their current levels on average. 
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Figure 6.7: The number of people in the working age,  out of the workforce 
Talking of unemployment, one should also consider the number of people keeping 
outside the labour force since they indeed give us an idea of the type of 
unemployment that is hidden. As can be seen from the graphs, the number of non-
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 active people may be expected to follow roughly the same pattern, decline gradually 
as in the base scenario then rise in two trends, settling back up and then facing 
downwards. The underlying reasons are, as mentioned, patterns of unemployment 
and of literacy. However, it is worthwhile to note that removal of barriers, taking the 
stress on the labour markets away, lowers the number of people unemployed in the 
long run. The difference between the patterns though never goes beyond 5% and lie 
at an average of 3% between the maximum and the minimum. In all though, work 
force participation rates in Turkey may be expected to rise. 
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6.2.4 Patterns of Employment 
6.2.4.1 Agricultural 
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Figure 6.8: The amount of people employed in the agricultural sector 
The number of people employed in the agricultural sector may be expected to lie low 
and drop steadily. Since employment in this sector is already too much than needed, 
the share of the agricultural workforce may be expected to go below 15%, in all 
scenarios. The number is slightly higher for the scenario concerning imminent 
withdrawal of barriers.   
6.2.4.2 Manufacturing  
As far as the manufacturing industry is concerned, a persistently increasing yet 
stabilising pattern may be kept. Since overall the population would be dropping, 
scenarios that involve removal of barriers are expected to be the only ones that lie 
somewhat lower in crude numbers of people employed in those sectors. The 
difference with the base scenario may again at most reach around 7%. With the 
others, though, the difference does not go beyond 0.1%. 
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Figure 6.9: The amount of people employed in the manufacturing goods 
sector  
6.2.4.3 Services 
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Figure 6.10: The amount of people employed in the services sector 
Employment patterns in the services sector would be parallel to the changes in the 
manufacturing sector. Again, the difference between the scenario where barriers are 
removed, and the base scenario may reach 7%. The sensitivity of employment rates 
in different sectors to policies seems largely inelastic, possibly due to high capital 
substitution possibilities. 
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 6.2.5 Population 
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Figure 6.11: Total Population of Turkey 
A steady increase in the country’s population is observed, which follows the same 
course under all scenarios. Uniformity in the course of increase under all policies 
continues until the year 2018, when different policies result in different courses in 
population increase. A policy where barriers are dropped instantly leads to the 
smallest population increase after 2018, whilst their gradual removal follows with 
similar results. The population remains steady between 2024 and 2029, and starts to 
decrease thereafter. The two scenarios are set to converge in the year 2033. Under all 
other scenarios, the population increase is much more marked after 2018, and the 
impetus in growth subsides somewhere around 2025. Overall, the change in 
population is not expected to go beyond 4%. It should also be noted that higher 
investment in education and higher level of funds from the EU may help in reducing 
the population by half a percent each. Average annual growth rate is expected to get 
lower and lower, reaching about 0.8% on average. The decline in growth rates, 
totally contingent on the literacy indices, is expected to be almost linear and even 
minus values can be observed by early 2030’s. 
The stabilisation of the population may be expected to be beneficial for Turkey at 
large. It should be noted that it will be at this period of stabilisation that drops in the 
unemployment rate and relatively higher increases in literacy and gdp per capita 
values are expected to be observed. This basically is due to the fact that high levels 
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 of increases in government expenses in Turkey under high levels of population 
pressure, cannot go beyond than dispersing current levels of development 
throughout the country. However, in a setting where the increase in population may 
be controlled, the investments may be expected to go further down on increasing the 
level of attainment rather than increasing sheer numbers of people in that group. 
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6.2.6 Agricultural Sector 
6.2.6.1 Total Agricultural Production 
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Figure 6.12: The total level of production in the agricultural sector 
The Agricultural Goods production may be expected to rise at a slow pace until mid 
2010’s and then gain momentum. The production overall is expected to rise due to 
the increase in population. Increasing population will need higher levels of food and 
although overall the number of people employed in the sector may not be expected 
to rise very much, the production will, thanks to capital increase and increases in 
literacy rates. As is the case with employment, removal of barriers on immigration 
will boost the agricultural production. The basic reason will, as mentioned, be higher 
levels of capital flow and availability of workers. A similar reasoning applies to the 
case where funds to Turkey are increased. As the literacy rate is increased on the 
other hand, since more qualified labour will always, within the context of our model, 
produce more, an increase in production may be observed. Interesting though, it may 
sound, harmonisation of the trade regimes may not have too much effect on 
agricultural production since structural considerations on the Turkish market may 
mean lack of competitiveness when foreign markets are concerned. Overall, up to 
28% increase in levels of agricultural production may be observed if the barriers are 
removed. The increase should be around 11% and 8% respectively when increasing 
65 7
 the funds and the investment in education are concerned. On average, year on year 
disparity may go around 6%. 
6.2.6.2 Agricultural Exports 
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Figure 6.13: The total amount of agricultural goods exports 
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Figure 6.14: The total amount of agricultural goods exports to the EU 
As the trends in agricultural production are translated into exports, as far as the EU 
is concerned, the extra production allowed through the specific trends that removal 
of barriers on immigration may invoke, would help in boosting the exports, followed 
by the removal of barriers and increases in funds and investment on education. 
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 Gradual removal of barriers and the allowance of funds would closely follow these 
policies. 
As for the exports to the outside world, on the other hand, the trends are slightly 
different. In most scenarios, a gradual decline in exports, followed by an increase 
may be expected. However, a particularity may be observed as the impact of trade 
harmonisation is considered: It may indeed smoothen the increase in exports to the 
outside world and resist the fall in exports right until 2010’s. From then on, a slight 
stagnation then increase may be observed. However, as we get nearer to 2030’s, the 
removal of barriers gets the hold, as it does in the exports to the EU. However, if 
structural considerations are not catered for, trade harmonisation may not be as 
useful for the agricultural markets in Turkey by itself. Up to 59% increase in exports 
(in 2010), with a year on year average of 40% may be observed. As for exports to 
the EU, corresponding figures lie at around 60% (although this time the take over 
takes place later), and 34%. The level of disparity is the most stable if the funds from 
the EU or on education are increased 
6.2.6.3 Agricultural Imports 
When imports are concerned, it may be seen that removal of barriers on immigration 
still takes the lead eventually. One possible reason for that is the relative increase in 
GNP per head that is observed in these policies. What is more striking though is that 
trade harmonisation will definitely be better for the imports than for the exports. 
Harmonisation of trade regimes may cause the imports to rise substantially in mid-
2010’s whereas in alternative scenarios this is not as powerful. Its effect is indeed 
more visible especially when imports from the outside world are considered. 
However, the relative positioning of the remaining policies is almost the same, with 
increases in education causing the imports to decrease over all, until 2030’s. It is 
interesting to note that except the policies where trade regimes are harmonised and 
where barriers are gradually dropped, the base scenario causes the imports to stay at 
higher levels. Up to 76% increase may be observed in imports when compared with 
the base scenario eventually (54% for the imports from the EU. Over the course of 
time though, this disparity may as well go up to 4 times between the cases of trade 
harmonisation and barriers on immigration, possibly also due to the fact that there 
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 will be a disparity in population numbers, causing the latter to have less demand. 
The impact is half as much when trade with the EU is concerned.  
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Figure 6.15: The total amount of agricultural goods imports 
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Figure 6.16: The total amount of agricultural goods imports from the EU 
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6.2.7 Manufacturing Goods Sector 
6.2.7.1 Total Manufacturing Goods Production 
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Figure 6.17: The total level of production in the manufacturing goods sector 
The manufacturing production is expected to rise drastically. The highest benefit is 
expected to be obtained if barriers on immigration are removed, followed by the 
increase in funds to Turkey and increase in educational funds. Harmonisation of the 
trade regimes is not expected to give as much contribution as it would in the 
agricultural sector since there already is a high level of customs union in that 
domain. The patterns make us think that the prime reasons for this hike are the rises 
in education and in investments. Actually a pitfall of the model can be observed here 
since, although normally relatively more educated of the workforce is expected to 
move easier due to eased barriers provided by literacy (although not the most 
educated, since they can find work in the home country easier), in the model it was 
assumed that the profile of the workers that leave the country are exactly the same as 
the country average. The increase in literacy levels of the country, provided with the 
decreasing levels of population and increased amount of foreign capital that would 
emerge with the declining levels of barriers are expected to contribute to industrial 
output, together with relatively higher levels of per capita income. All these 
assumptions though may be challenged. 
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Overall, the disparity in levels of production may reach 39% in the given settings. A 
possible increase in the funds in education and funds to Turkey may translate as 13% 
and 15% increase respectively, whereas a harmonisation of trade regimes may 
increase the output by 4%, comparable to the 7% boost of the allowance of funds to 
Turkey. 
6.2.7.2 Manufacturing Goods Exports 
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Figure 6.18:  The total amount of manufacturing goods exports 
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Figure 6.19: The total amount of manufacturing goods exports to the EU 
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 The hike in levels of production translates into export levels roughly on par. One 
striking difference though is that, trade harmonisation seems to be offsetting the 
effect of gradual removal of barriers, followed by close margins, by harmonisation 
of trade regimes and increases in funds in education. Exports to the EU can be 
expected to rise by more than 31 times, which means that the share of exports to the 
EU will increase substantially in all given settings. Corresponding increase in the 
total manufacturing exports though may lie at around 18 times. Therefore, over all, 
the increase in industrial output mainly meets the increase in local demand. With 
low levels of trade barriers on the other hand, Turkey may be expected to be a 
manufacturing base for the EU. However, the impact such a liberalisation would 
have on exports in the short run, which is higher than any other scenario, may slow 
down later. Trade harmonisation may be expected to raise the total exports to the EU 
by 4%, far behind the 13% increase offered by increases in funds in education. The 
doubling of the funds to Turkey on the other hand may help with an increase of 
around 15%. Corresponding figure for the exports at large are 10%, 11%, 13% 
respectively. The effects of removal of barriers on the other hand may reach 40% 
6.2.7.3 Manufacturing Goods Imports 
Imports from the EU are expected to rise at slower rates. Most probably, since costs 
of production are expected to be lower in Turkey, a substantial amount of industrial 
production may be thought to be channelled in to Turkey. On the other hand, total 
manufacturing imports are expected to rise quite faster, at around 20 times. One 
basic reason for this is that the bulk of Turkish imports are on semi-finished goods. 
Therefore, as the industrial production in Turkey increases, it is expected to trigger 
further increase in industrial imports overall. However, these semi-finished goods 
are mostly brought from countries where they can be produced for less. Therefore 
increases in Turkish production may be translated into higher levels of imports from 
the outside world. The impact of different policies on the other hand are comparable 
to the ones for production with the slight difference that as it concerns overall 
imports, allowance of funds may offset the effect of trade liberalisation quite earlier. 
As for the liberalisation of trade regimes, it may give a higher boost in imports this 
time more for the EU, in the short run. 
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Figure 6.20: The total amount of manufacturing goods imports 
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Figure 6.21: The total amount of manufacturing goods imports from the EU 
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6.2.8 Services Sector 
6.2.8.1 Total Services Production 
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Figure 6.22: The total level of production in the services sector 
The changes in the levels of services production mimic the changes in industrial 
production in the broad sense. Since the payoffs of education are greater in the 
services sector though, the disturbance caused by different levels of literacy is 
higher. In all scenarios, the services sector will most probably make up for the 
majority of the total output, as expected. The increase offered by the liberalisation of 
trade regimes though can be minimal, since the bulk of services production 
traditionally aims at the local market. WTO publishes regular reports on the 
difficulties of trade on the services (e.g. World Trade Review 2004). In any case, 
trade liberalisation as it comes to services, is a highly debated issue in the EU itself, 
causing occasional frictions in EU summits. Over all, EU Commission reports stress 
the importance of liberalisation in services.  
Therefore, the benefits that Turkey could re-ape in this sector are debatable. 
Although it can be seen that 2% increase is still possible, though far from 16% 
increases offered by investment levels for education and increase in funds. One gain 
for sure, would be obtained if the level of literacy and the level of income in the 
country could be increased, in which case, Turkey would become a more lucrative 
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 market for service providers, and with a possibly highly educated labour force, a 
prime base for service exports. 
6.2.8.2 Services Exports 
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Figure 6.23: The total amount of services exports 
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Figure 6.24: The total amount of services exports to the EU 
As explained before, due to hardships on the trade on services, exports in the 
services sector are not as much affected by the application of different policies. 
Exports remain almost steady during the period from 2002 to 2008, where a period 
of gradual increase begins. The trend of increase becomes more dramatic after 2007, 
and thereafter some diversion between the different policies appears. The policy of 
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 instant drop of barriers wields a decrease in exports by about 1% overall and 7% 
when the EU is concerned. A similar drop is expected in the case of trade 
liberalisation, by drops of around 6-7% each. A policy of gradual removal of barriers 
on the other hand may help with an overall increase of 1%, despite a slight decrease 
when the EU is concerned. The only policy that provides for substantial increases in 
both export groups is investment in education, helping with an increase of 1% for 
the exports to the EU and 3% with exports overall.  In all, the exports are expected 
to rise by 15 folds and disparity among different policies may go up to 4.5%.  
6.2.8.3 Services Imports 
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Figure 6.25: The total amount of services imports  
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Figure 6.26: The total amount of services imports from the EU 
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 Services imports are expected to rise by about 5 times overall. Considering that 
Turkey already is a net exporter of services (WTO, 2004), this may increase 
Turkey’s surplus since exports will be growing at a higher pace already. The highest 
increases again are observed by the introduction of policies based on the removal of 
barriers, at 35% and 25%. In all other scenarios, the rise may be expected to be 
confined to around 9% for imports from the EU and 6% in the overall setting, which 
although implying higher levels once more, do not cause much disturbance so far as 
the trade surplus in the sector is concerned. 
In both cases, trade liberalisation would be the second most important imports-
booster, at around 12% for imports overall and 16% for the imports from the EU. 
Therefore the trade surplus is expected to be the least if trade regimes are 
harmonised completely, although the actual amounts do not differ too much. 
Indeed, HERMIN models developed for EU peripheral economies in 1997 had also 
shown that as trade liberalisation proceeds, major sub-components of the 
manufacturing sector as well as some aspects of services switch from being 
essentially non-tradable to being internationally tradable. In the case of the SEM 
(Single European Market) and the CSF (Community Support Framework) 
programmes, this change results from the dismantling of non-tariff barriers such as 
restrictive public procurement policies or from, for example, a decline in transport 
costs arising from improved access infrastructure. Similar considerations are likely 
to apply during Turkey’s move towards EU membership. 
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 6.2.9 Per capita income 
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Figure 6.27: Per capita income in Turkey 
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Figure 6.28: Per capita income in Turkey as a ratio of that of the EU 
Per capita income in Turkey is expected to rise steadily, no matter what scenario 
alternative is chosen. By 2030’s in the base scenario, the levels are expected to attain 
50% of the EU average. In the scenarios where immigration barriers are removed, 
presumably, due to increasing levels of education, relaxed labour markets and higher 
flows of investment, the level of income may be expected to reach around three 
quarters of the EU average and this may reverse the migration shortly afterwards. 
This policy is followed by the cases where the barriers are gradually dropped and 
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 where the funds are doubled, both offering about 15% increase. Investments in 
education may pay back by about 13% increase in GDP per capita. Trade 
liberalisation on the other hand, which may boost the income by the same amounts 
as would the removal of barriers, may lose the lead, yet offering an increase of about 
11%. The effect of the relaxation of funds to Turkey on the other hand may lie 
around 7%. One basic implication here is that Turkey can increase its level of 
income substantially by reserving higher funds to education only. The effects may 
offset any to be funds that could be coming from the EU. As far as these funds are 
concerned though, it should be noted that they offer increasing returns to scale, since 
Turkey is short of extra money to be pumped into the system. As far as the EU is 
concerned on the other hand, the removal of barriers may cause around 1% decrease 
or none at all and harmonisation of trade regimes may have the opposite effect at 
around 2%. It is observed though that fast removal of barriers may be slightly better 
than gradual removal, since it will probably allow for previous migrants to integrate 
into the system, meaning that they can find jobs and invest abroad and so on. 
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 6.2.10 Education 
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Figure 6.29: Average Years of Schooling in Turkey 
One of the basic problems in Turkey is lack of education. Increases in population 
make it harder for governments to adequately respond to the rising demand for 
education and even keep up with current levels. Although recently new policies have 
been enacted to increase minimum number of years of schooling to 8 years and 
although very high efforts are vested into building up for adequate infrastructure, 
one cannot foresee to what extent the benefits can be reaped. 
In all given scenarios, the average number of years of schooling is expected to rise 
steadily. A basic rupture though may be observed as of mid 2010’s. From that point 
onwards, on the scenario in which barriers are removed is expected to contribute to 
the number of years of schooling by more than 14%. However, higher investments 
in education may also pay off by half as fast increase, on a close follow up from the 
case where funds to Turkey are increased. The increase that relaxation of funds to 
Turkey can give may be expected to yield around 4% of an increase. Overall, in all 
scenarios, the minimum 8 years requirement may be fulfilled, compared to levels of 
today where it is less than half as much. The least increase is expected to be coming 
from trade liberalisation, at around 1%. 
This increase in education on the other hand, will translate into the productivity 
levels as well as human development levels and the per capita income. 
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 6.2.11 Debt Stock 
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Figure 6.30: Total Amount of outstanding loans 
After an initial period of decrease in Turkey’s debt stock, there is considerable 
divergence in the results the various scenarios present. The policy of higher 
investment to education creates a dramatic increase in debt, which over 25 years 
skyrockets by six folds. The other policies converge producing a steady decrease in 
debt until 2013, when all of them start giving higher levels of debt. Possible reasons 
for increase in this period may be related to relatively high levels of unemployment 
in the given period which brings about a higher share of the population confined to 
funds from the government, although the government would rely on the output 
generated by an employed labour force, which is presumably not growing as fast to 
compensate. This period is also expected to be one of high levels of investment, 
since may be due conditions may be making it more lucrative to invest. The 
increases in spending and loans in this period may therefore be about generating 
funds for future growth. The largest intensity is displayed by the policy of increasing 
funds to Turkey, which outputs higher levels of debt until the year 2029. A decrease 
follows thereafter. The policy of dropping barriers instantly produces a similar 
increase, which subsides after 2024. This policy presents the smallest debt stock than 
all others, followed by the policy where barriers are dropped gradually. Under this 
scenario, the debt continues to rise until 2025, beginning to drop thereafter. In both 
cases this period of decrease in the debt stock precedes the drop in the base scenario 
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 by some years. One possible reason for this is the fact that population figures, in 
these scenarios are expected to stabilise at around similar times, therefore, reducing 
the pressure on the necessity to increase government expenditures. Increased levels 
of per capita income and average literacy rates, combined with relatively lower 
government expenditure, may be expected to give governments opportunity to 
reduce the debt stock. Other policies continue to give an increase. However, the 
pattern should be further studied since they may be cyclical.. 
The difference in the debt stock that various policies may offer can rise up to 2 folds 
if the dropping of the barriers is not considered. However, in none of the scenarios is 
the government debt stock/ GNP ratio expected to be over 30%, which is well in 
tune with Maastricht Criteria.  
6.2.12 Budget Deficit 
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Figure 6.31: The budget deficit 
While all policies present an increase in the budget deficit until the year 2008, the 
results are very divergent after an initial period of convergence between 2002 and 
2005. The policy of higher investment in education produces the largest increase in 
budget deficit, the policies of increasing funds to Turkey, granting of accession 
funds and harmonisation of trade regimes following at a large distance. The policies 
of dropping barriers instantly and removing them gradually lead to a lesser increase 
in the deficit, which is offset by 2028 and 2030 respectively.  In the worst case 
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 scenario, the budget deficit may get very acute and translated into huge demands for 
debt. However, in all cases, stabilisation of the deficit may be observed around mid-
2020’s. In the worst case scenario, which happens if funds to education are increased 
by two folds, the budget deficit may reach a quarter of the budget. This partly is due 
to the fact that high increases in government spending on education will not be met 
by equally increasing funds. In most other cases though, the deficit is nevertheless 
expected to rise by around eight folds than current levels. It is interesting to see, as 
was argued by, the budget deficit may be expected to rise by a large margin if trade 
regimes are harmonised completely. The removal of barriers and increasing of funds 
to Turkey may help in increasing the revenues, and in the case of removal of 
barriers, even high surpluses may be observed. Either way, it seems that it may be a 
challenge for Turkey to meet the Maastricht criterion that requires the budget deficit 
not to go over 3% of the budget, one that is also troubling France, Germany and 
many members of the EU itself. 
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 6.2.13 A general evaluation 
When all the policies are simultaneously evaluated, it can be seen that the highest 
discrepancy is caused by dropping the barriers instantly. However, a more through 
and numerical analysis may be required to see if the changes are well significant. 
To this end, paired- t-tests were carried on all parameters mentioned in 
table1compare you can find the average of the p-values when the outcomes 
pertaining to all of the policies are considered simultaneously with what they would 
be in the base scenario. 
It can be seen that the highest discrepancy among the scenarios is obtained when the 
barriers are dropped at once. This is followed by the option where barriers are 
gradually removed.  
The harmonisation of trade regimes is a close follower, with around 2% p- value, 
itself followed by a 2.42% p value for the scenario where barriers are gradually 
dropped. 
The scenario where funds are increased offers a 2.77% p- value which is again quite 
low. 
The policy that involves investment in education follows the latter value at a close p 
value and proves that it has proven different results when enacted. 
It can be seen that All of these three policies result in significantly different results 
that the base scenario, at 5% level of significance. 
Table 6.1 P-values for t-test averages for the scenarios tested against the base  
Barriers 
dropped inst. 
Harmonization 
of trade 
Barriers 
gradually dropped 
Funds 
increased 
Investment 
in Education 
Funds 
allowed 
0.0021 0.0207 0.0242 0.0277 0.0284 0.0359 
One may therefore conclude that the real impetus for change in the Turkish economy 
should be structural. Mere relaxations funds may not be sufficient if they are not 
backed up with for instance policies on education or easing of trade barriers. The 
former would help in channelling growth and funds to more sustainable causes, 
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 whereas the latter would bring competitiveness and larger markets at the industry’s 
disposal, hence making more efficient use of the funds. 
The basic problem in the Turkish Economy seems to be on the utilisation of labour. 
This should be the main reason why relaxations on labour markets seem to offer the 
most significant of all changes. Overall, these changes are expected to be beneficial 
for Turkey but they not necessarily offer a Nash equilibrium, since they are not as 
profitable for the EU, at least if they are just enacted as they are, without any 
structural backing. 
Nevertheless, removal of barriers seems to keep enough labour in the internal market 
to reach similar production levels. This allows for a higher level of trade for the 
items, especially in exports. 
A win-win situation though arises when higher levels of investment are channelled 
to education, despite a relatively harsh and vulnerable period of large government 
borrowing. This shows in return that, there is plenty of room for improvement within 
the confinements of the Turkish economy, without necessarily resorting to any 
foreign aid. Education, is may be the most important of all investments that the 
government may choose. However, it gives us an idea on that possible similar 
intervention mechanisms can as well be thought upon. 
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 6.3 Possible Membership Scenario 
A possible membership in the EU, if our scenario conditions are met, will be good 
for Turkey. 
We can see that the population stock will be limited to less than 85 million, which is 
around 4% less than how it would otherwise be. This will be good for Turkey since 
reductions in tax expenditures and alleviations in the total pressure exerted on labour 
markets will be felt. 
The unemployment rate will drop especially after total accession takes place. In 
total, the reduction may be by more than 2 points. 
Lower rates of unemployment on the other hand, will be met by as high labour 
participation rates, adding up to a combined sum of more than 2% increase in the 
number of jobs relative to the population that can be created. 
The increase in available funds and the decrease of population on the other hand, 
may help in increasing the average years of schooling by a year, which most 
probably would not have otherwise taken place in a decade. 
The worst though should be expected in the trade deficit generated especially with 
the EU. The easing of barriers will cause industrial imports from to EU to upsurge 
by in total around 65% more, although the expansion in the export volume will be 
around 45%. In total, the largest relative gain may be expected to be in the trade 
surplus in the agricultural sector over all, but even then, the imports will be rising at 
a faster pace than the exports. 
However, since relatively more people will be working than the non-active 
population and since the total population will drop, total government expenditures 
may be expected to drop or at least change less than the incomes in relative terms. 
On the other hand, gains in affluence and customs duties as well as increasing 
amounts of funds from the EU will hold the incomes at a higher level. In such a 
setting, the budget deficit may be expected to shrink, which it indeed does. From late 
2020’s, the deficit may turn into a surplus and quite large sums of surplus may be 
expected. 
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 The debt stock may as well follow a similar decrease. The debt stock is expected to 
decrease until 2014 and then rise until mid 2020’s and decline back again. The rise 
in between may be due to structural requirements for accommodating to new 
circumstances that especially the membership may entail. Either way, considerable 
decreases in the debt stock may be observed, reducing government expenditures 
even further. 
Meanwhile the total amount of foreign investments into Turkey may be expected to 
grow by about two folds. Within these investments on the other hand, the EU’s share 
may be expected to go up by around 15% more and make up the majority. 
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Figure 6.32: Debt Stock and the number of migrants from Turkey to the EU 
under the  membership scenario 
The number of migrants to the EU will most probably rise fast, especially after the 
opening of barriers (which could be expected in two years time following the 
membership, as is now the case with 10 newly joining countries.- Although this is 
considered to be a very optimistic estimate for Turkey, even if membership in 2014 
may sound equally unlikely for some). The number of migrants from Turkey to the 
EU should be expected to rise steadily (after a hike around 2016) right until late-mid 
2020’s where it may be expected to start dropping. In all, the Turkish population 
stock in the EU may be expected to rise by around 2.9 million, an estimate which is 
close to the one offered by WorldScan. 
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 However, when we consider increases in affluence, one interesting thing to note is 
that the per capita income in the EU may rise up to 5% with possible Turkish 
membership. Of course this increase is expected to be observed in the average GDP 
per capita levels of the EU countries excluding Turkey, which is assumed to be 
another member at the time. If Turkey is included as well, the change is reduced to 
around 2 out of a thousand.  
This is largely due to the fact that the exports to a large dynamic market will 
increase and since more investments will be channelled from the EU, higher payoffs 
can be expected as profits from abroad. This effect will even offset the number of 
migrants hat may be expected to join into the unemployed workforce. Even when 
they are concerned though, one should keep in mind that they will offer a balance 
between the rise in the workforce outside the labour force and the labour force, 
hence channel in sizeable amounts of income to the insurance system if well utilised. 
The effects on per capita income though will be much higher for Turkey. Through 
policies enacted via membership, Turkey may expect to reach up to 40% of the EU 
average by 2020’s (instead of a third) and 74% by 2030’s (instead of 52%). 
Therefore, convergence into the values of the EU can be expected to arrive quite 
sooner than expected. It should be noted to this end that Portugal, which has been a 
member of the European Community for 20 years by now, has not yet reached 70% 
of the average income. Therefore, dynamics in Turkey, which has a larger market, 
can be expected to work faster. 
When it translates into average wages, the wages in the services sector may be 
expected to rise by over 70%, whereas the wages in the industrial and the 
agricultural sectors would rise by 59% and 32% respectively. The average increase 
in income on the other hand should be around 60%, judging by the per capita 
income. The prices on the other hand, may rise slightly faster for agricultural and 
industrial goods. 
The matched pair t-tests between the normal case and the membership scenario, 
based on the hypothesis that they give similar results or not, results in a p-value of 
around 0.3%, which makes us strongly reject the null hypothesis even at 1% level of 
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 alpha, thereby concluding that the results of a possible membership are substantially 
different than the base scenario. 
Overall, this scenario shows us that although the trade balance deteriorates over 
time, the benefits of a possible membership will be very high. However, if they are 
not backed with proper policies, not only can these benefits not be reaped fully but 
also they may backfire on several fronts, especially when immigration and deficits in 
trade are concerned. 
The results are compiled in Table 6.2. 
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 Table 6.2 Comparative Results of the base and the membership scenarios 
 
2008 2008 2014 2014 2032 2032 
Ratio of Services 0.45 0.45 0.49 0.49 0.53 0.53 
Ratio of Industry 0.3 0.3 0.35 0.35 0.42 0.42 
Foreigninvestments 2736367 4027750 3149972 5163620 3895172 12724089 
Unemployment Rate 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.03 
Workforce participation 
Rate 0.75 0.76 0.8 0.8 0.81 0.81 
Cannot Work 35591089 35591609 38853191 38851871 40616759 40186618 
Non-active 7900981 7954857 8607359 8795285 9291156 9025706 
Unemployed 8215670 8158898 7587675 7461625 3231252 2080990 
Agr Employment 5710929 5710929 4198058 4198058 1667529 1667529 
Manufacturing 
Employment 6816493 6816493 8957505 8925146 15023367 14331705 
Services Employment 10437094 10436919 12687310 12641298 18753173 18047857 
Immigration from TR to 
EU 24.32 27.07 23.71 27.88 11.98 59.67 
Agr Imports from the 
EU 2.68 4.61 4.97 9.15 14.38 32.24 
Demand for Agr 
Products TR 63.91 79.71 95.76 128.64 254.12 431.50 
Demand for 
Manufactured Goods TR 203.73 249.75 294.28 389.18 1131.54 1992.41 
Deemand for Services 
TR 253.48 312.08 352.07 468.10 1246.87 2207.15 
Agr. Exports to the EU 3.03 4.14 5.24 7.41 25.98 64.60 
Manuf. Exports to the 
EU 68.34 75.34 111.09 128.37 565.43 857.22 
Manuf. Imp. from the 
EU 169.77 225.30 302.47 398.06 1095.25 1953.91 
TotalinEu 3200069 3202091 3419118 3428749 4152158 7106704 
Total Agr Imports TR 14.14 30.99 36.85 96.97 145.59 431.50 
Investmentsfromthe EU  946321 1458160 1089403 1882887 1347750 6117032 
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 Table 6.2 Comparative Results of the base and the membership 
scenarios(continued) 
 
2008 2008 2014 2014 2032 2032 
GNP TR  309.29 338.91 466.58 533.47 2231.22 3391.97 
Investmentsfromthe EU 946321 1458160 1089403 1882887 1347750 6117032 
GNP per head EU 27025.08 27223.16 31719.62 32158.12 50730.13 53324.54 
GNP per head TR 4141.91 4538.77 5767.96 6596.41 25187.83 39746.41 
Total Agr Prod. TR 26.28 28.60 30.26 34.13 54.48 74.99 
Total Industrial Prod. 
TR 117.14 129.15 190.44 220.06 969.31 1469.53 
Total Services Prod. TR 165.87 181.16 245.87 279.28 1207.43 1847.45 
Services Exports to EU 44.00 47.29 79.09 85.66 317.87 318.73 
Services Imports from 
EU 35.88 41.00 41.80 50.76 78.76 123.67 
Total Services Exports 45.45 48.88 81.91 88.78 362.93 384.95 
Total Services Imports 45.89 53.91 57.15 71.47 113.18 168.94 
Total Agr Exports 18.16 28.60 14.12 23.74 28.44 67.84 
Total Manufacturing 
Imports 229.50 290.23 356.94 459.83 1422.15 2401.80 
Total Manufacturing 
Exports 78.10 86.10 126.97 146.71 646.20 979.69 
Total Population 74672255 74669704 80891097 80873282 88583236 85340406 
debtStock 51.87 56.25 21.69 24.19 225.33 85.58 
Trade Deficit -147.83 -211.57 -227.94 -369.05 -643.34 -1569.77 
Budget Deficit -107.43 -74.3 -124.87 -208.06 -392.62 137.25 
Avg Years of Schooling 3.81 3.82 4.51 4.53 8.72 9.91 
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 7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In our study, we have tried to formulate a reasonable model to mimic economic 
patterns in Turkey. The model is basically constructed for two agents, Turkey and 
the EU, and in addition to those, the Rest of the World, with a higher level of detail 
given for Turkey than the EU. The basic model structure relies on an interplay 
between employment and demographic figures, that is, the labour markets, capital 
markets, and the dynamics of exports import patterns, that is the goods market. 
Regressions were cast based on past data to find the relations that govern these 
patterns and the coefficients were adjusted to fit into those. 
Through the model it was observed that population growth would stabilise and the 
per capita income would rise faster than the world and the EU average.  
IT was observed in the model that the economy is very susceptible to the course that 
EU integration will take place. Benefits of a possible membership seem to be very 
promising. Yet even plausible alternatives to that, as was very often debated 
especially through the pre-pre-accession talks, could bring economically quite 
positive results, although not quite as effective. 
Turkish trade volume is expected to boost even faster than the GNP, although this 
brings about a substantial trade deficit that may become unsustainable in the long 
run. This partly is translated into a budget deficit and net need for debts, although 
the relative ratio of the debt stock (to the GNP) may be expected to shrink. All these 
may mean that the growth may be taking place on vulnerable lines and hence gets 
quite susceptible to unpredictable shocks in the outside world.  
One interesting result was that though even within the policy scope of the 
government, adoption of certain decisions, such as doubling the funds on education, 
could bring positive results, although costs in such a setting, would be much higher. 
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 Nevertheless, all results should be evaluated within the confinements of the research 
carried out. It indeed is arguably very pretentious to model the Turkish economy at 
large, let alone modelling it as being ruled predominantly through domestic 
confluences only. After all, neither the political structure, nor international 
dynamics, nor relations with the outside world have been the same in the given 
period. Therefore, merely carrying out regressions on past data and extrapolating the 
results may be misleading. 
Nevertheless, the approach adopted was as free of bias as could be. Trying to 
introduce patterns for political structure may bring in a subjective evaluation of the 
period, just as would trying to discern different effects of outside origin in the sense 
that one would be forced into treating wars in Iraq, Vietnam and in Kosovo to have 
had the same effect on the Economy, just as fluctuations in relations with Greece 
and so on. At the end of the day, the bulk of the data belongs to the Cold War 
Period, which arguably might have had different dynamics than today. 
In a possible future model, such changes may be tried to be incorporated into the 
model, with of course these considerations in mind. A new mechanism for the 
foreign investments and the general mode of government investments may also be 
considered. 
In the model, the EU and the outside world were assumed to be ruled by quite 
constant patterns all over the time, which may be a strong assumption. However, 
since the emphasis was laid on Turkey alone, the underlying structures in these 
economies were mostly ignored. These could again be more elaborately held in an 
alternative setting. 
The harmonising effects of the EU have been only laid down in already available 
parameters, through funds and harmonisation in barriers on immigration and the 
trade regimes, and to an extent, foreign investments. However, considering that the 
EU is also a strong social project, coefficients in Turkey for most of the functions 
may be expected to smoothly converge to the ones in the EU. This, being a very 
strong assumption is not necessarily lack of evidence. A study on patterns in the EU, 
can be interpreted as to be giving evidence on the harmonising effects of the EU on 
the economic structure. 
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  A future model that can be developed on these lines could try testing more 
scenarios, such as having higher growth rates in the EU, possible EU expansion 
towards Ukraine and other countries, as well as, of course, the latest expansion; the 
EU taking on a more economic dimension or heading towards closer integration and 
so on.  
Overall, the study aimed at giving a some what more holistic modelling practice on 
the Turkish Economy, without getting too much confined in small microcosms of 
simple regression subspaces. The results were quite comparable with the ones 
obtained through other studies. The model may be further advanced to yield more 
reliable results. Nevertheless, on doing that the substantial increase that it would 
exert on the calculations should also be considered. 
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 APPENDIX A: VARIABLES AND THEIR UNITS 
AgrCapTR(t)  The Level of Agricultural Capital [TR] (bn$) 
AgrdemandfromTRtoEU  The amount of imports from the EU [TR] (bn $/year) 
AgrEU(t)  The Level of Production in the Agricultural Sector [TR] (bn $) 
agrincrease  Increase in Production for Agriculture [EU] ($/year) 
AgrInvTR  The Amount of Investments in Agriculture [TR] ($/year) 
agrprices(t)  Prices on Agricultural Goods [TR] ($) 
budgetdeficit  The amount of Disparity between the income and expenditures of the 
government [TR] (bn $) 
percapitaEU  Per capita income [EU] ($/person) 
percapitaincomeTR  Per capita income [TR] ($/person) 
percapitaworld  Per capita income [RoW] ($/person) 
landuse(t)  The Amount of Land Used for Agriculture [TR] (km2) (mln) 
newland  Increase in Land Used for Agriculture [TR] (km2/year) (mln) 
barAgrEU  Barriers on Trade in Agriculture Imposed on third countries
 [EU] (dimensionless) 
baragrEUTR  Barriers on Trade in Agriculture Imposed between TR and the EU
 [EU] (dimensionless) 
barAgrTR  Barriers on Trade in Agriculture Imposed on third countries
 [TR] (dimensionless) 
barIndEU  Barriers on Trade in Manuf. Goods  Imposed on third countries
 [EU] (dimensionless) 
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 barindTR  Barriers on Trade in Manuf. Goods  Imposed on third countries
 [TR] (dimensionless) 
barindTREU  Barriers on Trade in Manuf. Goods  Imposed on third countries
 [EU] (dimensionless) 
BarrierstoImTREU  Barriers on Immigration imposed [EU] (dimensionless) 
barsereu  Barriers on Trade in Services  Imposed on third countries [EU]
 (dimensionless) 
barserTR  Barriers on Trade in Services  Imposed on third countries [TR]
 (dimensionless) 
barserTREU  Barriers on Trade in Services  Imposed on third countries [EU]
 (dimensionless) 
bartoImEU  Barriers on Immigration imposed on Third Parties [EU]
 (dimensionless) 
bartoImfromTR  Barriers on Immigration imposed by Third Parties [RoW]
 (dimensionless) 
birthrateeu  Birth Rate of the population [EU] (dimensionless) 
deathrateeu  The ratio of (people) who die in a year [EU] (dimensionless) 
investmentrateeu  The Rate of Investments ffrom the budget of the EU
 [EU] (dimensionless) 
LiteracyTR  The Literacy Index [TR] (dimensionless) 
ratioofAgr  Ration of Workers in the Agricultural Sector [TR]
 (dimensionless) 
RatioofInd  Ration of Workers in the Industrial Sector [TR] (dimensionless) 
RatioofServices  Ration of Workers in the Services Sector [TR]
 (dimensionless) 
taxrateEU  tax rate in the EU [EU] (dimensionless) 
taxratetr  tax rate in TR [TR] (dimensionless) 
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 UERateTR  The ratio of unemployment [TR] (dimensionless) 
ActivityRate  The rate of (people) in the Working Age who are Actively seeking 
Work or Employed [TR] (people) 
aging  The Number of (people) in the Labourforce who Grow Old
 [EU] (people/year) 
agingrateeu  The Fraction of (people) in the Labourforce who Grow Old
 [EU] (people) 
AgrTR(t)  The Number of (people) Employed in the Agricultural Sector
 [TR] (people) 
AgrUETR  The Increase in the Number of (people) Employed in Agr. [TR]
 (people/year) 
birtheu  The Number of Births [EU] (people/year) 
cannotwork(t)  The Number of (people) Who are too old or too Young to 
Work [TR] (people) 
deatheu  The Number of Deaths [EU] (people/year) 
IncreaseinLiteracy  The increase in the Weighted Literacy [TR]
 (people/year) 
IndUETR  The number of (people) who find a job in the ind. Sector [TR]
 (people/year) 
Joiningandleavingtheworkforce  The difference Between Those Who Join the 
Workforce and Those Who Leave [EU] (people/year) 
leavingTR  The Number of (people) Leaving Turkey [TR] (people/year) 
NonActive_Pop(t)  The Number of (people) Who Choose Not to Work [TR]
 (people) 
nonactiveEU(t)  The Number of (people) Who Choose Not to Work [EU]
 (people) 
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 NonActiveUnemp  The Number of (people) who move from(to) non-active 
to(from) unemployed [TR] (people/year) 
Populationincrease  The amount of net increase in the population [EU]
 (people/year) 
popworld  The World Population [RoW] (people/year) 
Quotaonmigration  Quotas on Migration [EU] (people) 
SerUETr  The Number of (people) who Get Employed in the Services Sector
 [TR] (people) 
ServicesTR(t)  The Number of (people) Working in the Services Sector [TR]
 (people) 
TotalinEu(t)  Total Stock of Population in the EU [TR] (people) 
totallabourdemandEU  Total amount of labour requirement [EU] (people) 
TotPop  total population [TR] (people) 
TotPopEU  total population [EU] (people) 
UETREU  Total Number of (people) who move to (from) the EU [EU]
 (people/year) 
UnEmpEU  The ratio of Unemployment [EU] (people) 
UnemployedEu(t)  The number of (people) Unemployed in the EU [EU]
 (people) 
UnemployedTr(t)  The number of (people) Unemployed [TR] (people) 
Weighted_Literacy(t)  Total level of literacy index [TR] (people) 
yearsofeducation  The Average Years of Education [TR] (Years) 
CapIncreaseTR  The Amount of Increase on the Capital Stock [TR] (bn 
$/year) 
Capital_UsedTR  The Amount of Free Capital Used for Consumption
 [TR] (bn $/year) 
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 CapitalAccumTR(t)  The Amount of Free Capital in the Economy [TR] (bn 
$) 
CPIAgrEU  CPI for Agr. [EU] ($) 
CPIAgrRoW  CPI for Agr. [RoW] ($) 
CPIIndEU  CPI for Ind. [EU] ($) 
CPIIndRoW  CPI for Ind. [RoW] ($) 
CPIRoW  CPI for Services [RoW] ($) 
DeamndagrTR  Demand for Agricultural Goods [TR] ($) 
DeamndindTR  Demand for Industrial Goods [TR] (bn $) 
DeamndserTR__  Demand for Services [TR] (bn $) 
debtincreaseTR  Total Amount of Money Borrowed [TR] (bn $/year) 
debtpayment  Total Debt Payment [TR] (bn $/year) 
debtTR(t)  The Amount of Outstanding Debt [TR] (bn $) 
DemandAgrEU Demand On Agricultural Goods Produced by the EU
 [EU] (bn $) 
DemandIndEU__  Demand On Industrial Goods Produced by the EU [EU] (bn 
$) 
demandRoWAgr  Demand for Agricultural Goods from the RoW [TR] (bn 
$) 
DemandRoWInd  Demand for Industrial Goods from the RoW [TR] (bn 
$) 
DemandRowSer  Demand for Services from the RoW [TR] (bn $) 
DemandserEU_  Demand for Services [EU] (bn $) 
DisposableIncomeEU_  The Level of Income that can be spent on consumtion
 [EU] (bn $) 
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 DisposableIncomeTR  The Level of Income that can be spent on consumtion
 [TR] (bn $) 
EducationfundsTR  The amount of budget allocated to education [TR] (bn 
$) 
Effective_AgrDemEU  Demand On Agricultural Goods Produced by the EU
 [EU] (bn $) 
Effective_AgrDemTR  Demand On Agricultural Goods Produced by TR
 [TR] ($) 
Effective_SerDemEU  Demand On Services Produced by the EU [EU] (bn 
$) 
Effective_SerDemTR  Demand On Services Produced by TR [TR] (bn 
$) 
EffectiveAgrdemand_from_EUtoTR  The Level of Exports to the EU
 [EU] (bn $) 
EffectiveIndDemfromEUtoTR  The Level of Industrial Imports FROM the EU
 [EU] (bn $) 
EffectiveIndDemFromTRtoEU  The Level of Industrial eXports FROM the EU
 [TR] (bn $) 
Expenditureincrease  Amount of Increase in Government Expenditures [TR] (bn 
$/year) 
Expire  Expired investments in education [TR] (mn $) 
expiredagr  The Amount of Investments in Agriculture that expire in a year
 [TR] (bn $) 
expiredcapital  The Amount of Free Capital that expired [TR] (bn $/year) 
expiredind  The Amount of Capital Stock in the Industry that expires [TR] (bn 
$/year) 
expiredserv  The Amount of Capital Stock in the Services Sector that expires
 [TR] (bn $/year) 
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 Expiry  Expired investments in investments abroad [EU] (bn $/year) 
Foreigninvestment  The Amount of Investments from the RoW [TR] ($/year) 
foundjobs  The Number of (people) who find a job in the EU [EU]
 (people/year) 
Funds_toTR  Funds allocated to TR [EU] (bn $) 
GovernmentExpenditures(t)  Total Amount of Government Expenditures [TR] (bn 
$) 
GovtInvestmentsTR  Government Investments [TR] (bn $) 
ImmigrationtoEU  Total Number of (people) who move to (from) the EU
 [EU] (people/year) 
ImpagrTR  Total Agricultural Imports [TR] (bn $) 
IncomeEU  Total GDP of the EU [EU] (bn $) 
IncomeTR  Total GDP of TR [TR] (bn $) 
IncreaseinDemand  Increase in Demand for the RoW [RoW] (bn $/year) 
incrser  The increase in Services Production [EU] (bn $/year) 
IndCapInvTR  The Amount of Money Invested in Manuf. Industry in a year
 [TR] ($/year) 
IndCapitalTR(t)  The Amount of Capital Accumulation for the Manuf. Goods. 
Industry  [TR] ($) 
IndEU(t)  The level of Production in the Manuf. Goods. Industry  [EU] (bn 
$) 
Indincrease  The level of increase in Manuf Goods Production [EU] (bn $) 
Indpricestr(t)  The level of Prices in the Manuf. Goods Sector [TR] ($) 
IndTR(t)  The level of employment in the Manuf. Goods Sector [TR]
 (People) 
interestpaymenttr  The amount of Money paid on Interest in Turkey [TR] (bn 
$/year) 
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 Investment  The amount of Investments done by domestic Investors [TR] (bn 
$/year) 
InvestmentinEd(t)  The Amount of Government Investment in Education
 [TR] ($) 
Investmentsabroad(t)  The total Amount of Money Investment Stock from the EU
 [EU] ($) 
InvestmentsabroadEU  The Amount of Money Invested from the EU
 [EU] ($/year) 
minwageTR  The Amount of Minimum Wage [TR] ($) 
movetoEU  The Amount of Increase in the Turkish Stock of Population in the EU
 [EU] (people) 
naturalincrease  Net Annual Increase Rate on Population [TR]
 (people/year) 
priceincindtr  Increase in Prices on Manufactured Goods [TR] ($/year) 
priceincrease  Price Increase on Agricultural Goods [TR] ($/year) 
priceincservtr  The Amount of Increase in the level of Prices in the Services Sector
 [TR] ($/year) 
productivityAgrEU  The Level of Agricultural Production [EU] (bn $) 
productivityAgrTR  The Level of Agricultural Production [TR] (bn $) 
productivityIndEU  The Level of Industrial Production [EU] (bn $) 
productivityIndTR  The Level of Industrial Production [TR] (bn $) 
productivitySerEU  The Level of Services Production [EU] (bn $) 
productivitySerTR  The Level of Services Production [TR] (bn $) 
propensitytoconsumecapitalTR  The Ratio of Free Capital Consumed[TR] ($) 
PrSerEU__  Prices on Services in the EU [EU] ($) 
SerCapTR(t)  The Amount of Capital Accumulation for the Sevices Sector
 [TR] (bn $) 
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 serdemandEUtoTR  Services exports to the EU [TR] (bn $) 
serdemandTRtoEU  Services imports from the EU [TR] (bn $) 
sereu(t)  Level of Production for Services in the EU [EU] ($) 
SerInvTR  The Amount of Money Invested in Services in a year [TR] (bn 
$) 
servexpTR  The Amount of Capital In the Manuf Goods Sector that expires
 [TR] (bn $) 
ServicespricesTr(t)  The Level of Prices in the Services Sector [TR] ($) 
servimpTR  The level of services imports [TR] (bn $) 
TaxIncomeEU  total tax income for the EU [EU] (bn $) 
TaxIncomeTR  total tax income for TR [TR] (bn $) 
totalDemandforEUInd  Total demand for Industrial goods produced in the EU
 [EU] (bn $) 
totaldemandforTRInd  Total demand for Industrial goods produced in TR
 [TR] (bn $) 
TotaldemandRoW(t)  Total Level of Demand from RoW [RoW] (bn $) 
TotalExportsAgr  Total amount of agricultural exports [TR] (bn $) 
Totalforeigninvestment  totla amount of money invested by foreign sources
 [TR] (bn $/year) 
totalimports  Total level of imports [TR] (bn $) 
totalimptrind  total level of exports [TR] (bn $) 
totalindexptr  total level of industrial exports [TR] (bn $) 
tradedeficit  Disparity between imports and exports [TR] (bn $) 
tradedeficiteu  Disparity between imports and exports [EU] (bn $) 
wages_on_agrTR_  The Average Level of Wages inn Agriculture [TR] ($) 
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 wages_on_indTR_  The Average Level of Wages in the Manuf. GoodsIndustry
 [TR] ($) 
wages_on_serTR_  The Average Level of Wages in the Services Sector
 [TR] ($)
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APPENDIX B: EQUATIONS 
 
AgrCapTR(t) =  AgrCapTR(t -  dt) +  (AgrInvTR -  expiredagr)  ×   dt 
INIT AgrCapTR =  31527522 
AgrInvTR =  exp(- 17.88) ×  (AgrCapTR^(- 0.904)) ×  ((AgrCapTR+ 
IndCapitalTR+ SerCapTR)^0.895) ×  (((productivityAgrTR) / 
delay(productivityAgrTR,1))^7.102) ×  (wages_on_agrTR_^(- 3.187)) ×  
(percapitaincomeTR^4.587) 
expiredagr =  AgrCapTR ×  0.01 
AgrEU(t) =  AgrEU(t -  dt) +  (agrincrease)  ×   dt 
INIT AgrEU =  308481 
agrincrease =  AgrEU ×  0.0079 
agrprices(t) =  agrprices(t -  dt) +  (priceincrease)  ×   dt 
INIT agrprices =  1.31 
priceincrease =  (TotalExportsAgr^0.236) ×  (ImpagrTR^(- 0.172)) ×  
(Effective_AgrDemTR^0.076) ×  (productivityAgrTR^0.808) ×  exp(- 3.65)- 
agrprices 
AgrTR(t) =  AgrTR(t -  dt) +  (-  AgrUETR)  ×   dt 
INIT AgrTR =  7769000 
AgrUETR =  (- exp(1.052) ×  (Weighted_Literacy^(- 0.061)) ×  ((wages_on_agrTR_ 
/ (landuse / 100))^(0.111)) ×  (AgrTR^0.952)+ AgrTR 
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 cannotwork(t) =  cannotwork(t -  dt) +  (naturalincrease -  
Joiningandleavingtheworkforce)  ×   dt 
INIT cannotwork =  31288519 
naturalincrease =  TotPop ×  Populationincrease 
Joiningandleavingtheworkforce =  delay(naturalincrease ×  1.5,5+ LiteracyTR ×  
3,naturalincrease)- (0.01+ 0.005 ×  LiteracyTR) ×  (NonActive_Pop+ 
IndTR+ AgrTR+ UnemployedTr+ ServicesTR) 
CapitalAccumTR(t) =  CapitalAccumTR(t -  dt) +  (CapIncreaseTR +  
Foreigninvestment +  InvestmentsfromtheEU -  SerInvTR -  IndCapInvTR -  
AgrInvTR -  Capital_UsedTR -  expiredcapital)  ×   dt 
INIT CapitalAccumTR =  10000000000 
CapIncreaseTR =  GovtInvestmentsTR ×  1000000000 
Foreigninvestment =  (100000000000 ×  ((IncomeTR)^0.2)+ CapitalAccumTR ×  
0.1+ delay((AgrInvTR+ IndCapInvTR+ SerInvTR),1) ×  0.4+ 0.2 ×  
(delay(CapitalAccumTR,1)- 0.1 ×  delay(CapitalAccumTR,2))) / 
(barAgrTR+ barindTR+ barserTR) 
InvestmentsfromtheEU =  (DisposableIncomeEU_ ×  10000000+ 300 ×  
Foreigninvestment) / ((100 ×  baragrEUTR+ 100 ×  barindTREU+ 100 ×  
barserTREU+ BarrierstoImTREU))+ 0 ×  (barAgrTR+ barindTR+ barserTR) 
SerInvTR =  exp(- 8.658) ×  ((1000000 ×  (productivityAgrTR+ productivityIndTR+ 
productivitySerTR))^0.764) ×  (Weighted_Literacy^0.823) ×  
((priceincservtr / (ServicespricesTr ×  (wages_on_serTR_ / 
delay(wages_on_serTR_,1))))^1.589) ×  ((IndCapitalTR+ CapitalAccumTR+ 
AgrCapTR+ SerCapTR)^0.189)- SerCapTR 
IndCapInvTR =  exp(- 0.248)+ ((1+ 100 ×  Indpricestr / wages_on_indTR_)^0.167) 
×  ((IndCapitalTR+ AgrCapTR+ SerCapTR+ CapitalAccumTR)^0.331)+ 
((1000000 ×  IncomeTR)^1.19)) 
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 AgrInvTR =  exp(- 17.88) ×  (AgrCapTR^(- 0.904)) ×  ((AgrCapTR+ 
IndCapitalTR+ SerCapTR)^0.895) ×  (((productivityAgrTR) / 
delay(productivityAgrTR,1))^7.102) ×  (wages_on_agrTR_^(- 3.187)) ×  
(percapitaincomeTR^4.587) 
Capital_UsedTR =  propensitytoconsumecapitalTR ×  CapitalAccumTR 
expiredcapital =  CapitalAccumTR ×  0.1 
debtTR(t) =  debtTR(t -  dt) +  (debtincreaseTR -  debtpayment)  ×   dt 
INIT debtTR =  118.691 
debtincreaseTR =  debtpayment+ EducationfundsTR ×  10+ GovtInvestmentsTR- 
totalimports ×  0.15- TaxIncomeTR+ GovernmentExpenditures,debtpayment 
×  1.5+ IncomeTR / debtTR) 
debtpayment =  debtTR ×  0.12 
GovernmentExpenditures(t) =  GovernmentExpenditures(t -  dt) +  
(Expenditureincrease)  ×   dt 
INIT GovernmentExpenditures =  256 
Expenditureincrease =  exp(- 54.143) ×  (InvestmentinEd^0.895) ×  (TotPop^2.935) 
- GovernmentExpenditures 
IndCapitalTR(t) =  IndCapitalTR(t -  dt) +  (IndCapInvTR -  expiredind)  ×   dt 
INIT IndCapitalTR =  4846586359 
IndCapInvTR =  (exp(- 0.248)+ ((1+ 100 ×  Indpricestr / wages_on_indTR_)^0.167) 
×  ((IndCapitalTR+ AgrCapTR+ SerCapTR+ CapitalAccumTR)^0.331)+ 
((1000000 ×  IncomeTR)^1.19)) 
expiredind =  IndCapitalTR ×  0.01 
IndEU(t) =  IndEU(t -  dt) +  (Indincrease)  ×   dt 
INIT IndEU =  2554417 
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 Indincrease =  0.017 ×  IndEU 
Indpricestr(t) =  Indpricestr(t -  dt) +  (priceincindtr)  ×   dt 
INIT Indpricestr =  1.27 
priceincindtr =  exp(- 7.718) ×  (totalindexptr^(- 0.146)) ×  (totalimptrind^0.077) ×  
((productivityIndTR ×  1000)^0.714)- Indpricestr 
IndTR(t) =  IndTR(t -  dt) +  (-  IndUETR)  ×   dt 
INIT IndTR =  5174000 
IndUETR =  - exp(14.445) ×  (Weighted_Literacy^1.156) ×  
(wages_on_indTR_^1.156)+ IndTR 
InvestmentinEd(t) =  InvestmentinEd(t -  dt) +  (Investment -  Expire)  ×   dt 
INIT InvestmentinEd =  811 
Investment =  EducationfundsTR ×  0.2 ×  1000 
Expire =  InvestmentinEd ×  0.2 
Investmentsabroad(t) =  Investmentsabroad(t -  dt) +  (InvestmentsabroadEU -  
Expiry)  ×   dt 
INIT Investmentsabroad =  10000 
InvestmentsabroadEU =  investmentrateeu ×  TaxIncomeEU+ 
InvestmentsfromtheEU / 10000000 
Expiry =  Investmentsabroad ×  0.1 
landuse(t) =  landuse(t -  dt) +  (newland)  ×   dt 
INIT landuse =  23033 
newland =  min(exp(10.152) ×  ((AgrTR / (AgrTR+ IndTR+ ServicesTR))^0.097)- 
landuse,25000- landuse) 
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 nonactiveEU(t) =  nonactiveEU(t -  dt) +  (aging +  birtheu -  deatheu)  ×   dt 
INIT nonactiveEU =  174909 
aging =  TotPopEU ×  agingrateeu- delay(birtheu,18) 
birtheu =  birthrateeu ×  TotPopEU 
deatheu =  TotPopEU ×  deathrateeu 
NonActive_Pop(t) =  NonActive_Pop(t -  dt) +  (NonActiveUnemp)  ×   dt 
INIT NonActive_Pop =  10748290 
NonActiveUnemp =  max(exp(12.197) ×  ((IncomeTR / TotPop)^0.205) ×  
(Weighted_Literacy / TotPop)^(- 0.2) ×  ((0.9 ×  delay(UnemployedTr,3)+ 
0.7 ×  delay(UnemployedTr,2)+ 0.5 ×  delay(UnemployedTr,1))^0.378)- 
(NonActive_Pop),- NonActive_Pop ×  0.05) 
SerCapTR(t) =  SerCapTR(t -  dt) +  (SerInvTR -  expiredserv)  ×   dt 
INIT SerCapTR =  2561606362 
SerInvTR =  exp(- 8.658) ×  ((1000000 ×  (productivityAgrTR+ productivityIndTR+ 
productivitySerTR))^0.764) ×  (Weighted_Literacy^0.823) ×  
((priceincservtr / (ServicespricesTr ×  (wages_on_serTR_ / 
delay(wages_on_serTR_,1))))^1.589) ×  ((IndCapitalTR+ CapitalAccumTR+ 
AgrCapTR+ SerCapTR)^0.189)- SerCapTR 
expiredserv =  SerCapTR ×  0.01 
sereu(t) =  sereu(t -  dt) +  (incrser)  ×   dt 
INIT sereu =  5242556 
incrser =  sereu ×  0.035 
ServicespricesTr(t) =  ServicespricesTr(t -  dt) +  (priceincservtr)  ×   dt 
INIT ServicespricesTr =  1.904 
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 priceincservtr =  max(exp(- 0.064) ×  (servexpTR^(- 0.037)) ×  (servimpTR^(- 
0.159)) ×  ((DeamndserTR__+ servimpTR)^0.034) ×  ((10000 ×  IncomeTR / 
TotPop)^0.61),- 0.2 ×  ServicespricesTr) 
ServicesTR(t) =  ServicesTR(t -  dt) +  (-  SerUETr)  ×   dt 
INIT ServicesTR =  8637000 
SerUETr =  - exp(12.463) ×  (Weighted_Literacy^1.554) ×  
(wages_on_serTR_^0.557)+ ServicesTR,- ServicesTR ×  0.05 
TotaldemandRoW(t) =  TotaldemandRoW(t -  dt) +  (IncreaseinDemand)  ×   dt 
INIT TotaldemandRoW =  6359920 
IncreaseinDemand =  0.073 ×  TotaldemandRoW 
TotalinEu(t) =  TotalinEu(t -  dt) +  (movetoEU)  ×   dt 
INIT TotalinEu =  3000000 
movetoEU =  UETREU ×  1000+ TotalinEu ×  0.001 
UnemployedEU(t) =  UnemployedEU(t -  dt) +  (UETREU +  ImmigrationtoEU -  
foundjobs -  aging)  ×   dt 
INIT UnemployedEU =  13992 
UETREU =  exp(- 1.495) ×  ((percapitaEU / percapitaincomeTR)^2) ×  ((100 ×  
UnemployedTr / TotPop)^1.961) ×  ((100 ×  UnemployedEU / TotPopEU)^(- 
1.819)) ×  ((totallabourdemandEU / 1000)^17.478) ×  ((TotPop ×  (1- 
UERateTR) / 1000000)^(- 18.193)) ×  (LiteracyTR^8.223) / 
BarrierstoImTREU 
ImmigrationtoEU =  UETREU ×  popworld ×  (IncomeTR / TotPop) ×  
BarrierstoImTREU / (percapitaworld ×  bartoImEU) 
foundjobs =  totallabourdemandEU- DELAY(totallabourdemandEU,1) 
aging =  TotPopEU ×  agingrateeu- delay(birtheu,18) 
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 UnemployedTr(t) =  UnemployedTr(t -  dt) +  (AgrUETR +  IndUETR +  SerUETr 
+  Joiningandleavingtheworkforce -  UETREU -  NonActiveUnemp -  
leavingTR -  correction)  ×   dt 
INIT UnemployedTr =  3803191 
AgrUETR =  (- exp(1.052) ×  (Weighted_Literacy^(- 0.061)) ×  ((wages_on_agrTR_ 
/ (landuse / 100))^(0.111)) ×  (AgrTR^0.952)+ AgrTR) 
IndUETR =  - exp(14.445) ×  (Weighted_Literacy^1.156) ×  
(wages_on_indTR_^1.156)+ IndTR,- IndTR ×  0.05 
SerUETr =  exp(12.463) ×  (Weighted_Literacy^1.554) ×  
(wages_on_serTR_^0.557)+ ServicesTR,- ServicesTR ×  0.05 
Joiningandleavingtheworkforce =  delay(naturalincrease ×  1.5,5+ LiteracyTR ×  
3,naturalincrease)- (0.01+ 0.005 ×  LiteracyTR) ×  (NonActive_Pop+ 
IndTR+ AgrTR+ UnemployedTr+ ServicesTR) 
UETREU =  min(exp(- 1.495) ×  ((percapitaEU / percapitaincomeTR)^2) ×  ((100 ×  
UnemployedTr / TotPop)^1.961) ×  ((100 ×  UnemployedEU / TotPopEU)^(- 
1.819)) ×  ((totallabourdemandEU / 1000)^17.478) ×  ((TotPop ×  (1- 
UERateTR) / 1000000)^(- 18.193)) ×  (LiteracyTR^8.223) / 
BarrierstoImTREU 
NonActiveUnemp =  exp(12.197) ×  ((IncomeTR / TotPop)^0.205) ×  
(Weighted_Literacy / TotPop)^(- 0.2) ×  ((0.9 ×  delay(UnemployedTr,3)+ 
0.7 ×  delay(UnemployedTr,2)+ 0.5 ×  delay(UnemployedTr,1))^0.378)- 
(NonActive_Pop) 
leavingTR =  UETREU ×  1000 ×  BarrierstoImTREU / bartoImfromTR 
correction =  UETREU ×  999 
Weighted_Literacy(t) =  Weighted_Literacy(t -  dt) +  (IncreaseinLiteracy)  ×   dt 
INIT Weighted_Literacy =  132544940 
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 IncreaseinLiteracy =  min(exp(12.53) ×  ((InvestmentinEd)^0.922)- 
Weighted_Literacy,Weighted_Literacy ×  (0.01+ 0.0001 ×  (Funds_toTR ×  
5+ EducationfundsTR))+ Weighted_Literacy ×  0.1 ×  ((naturalincrease+ 
delay(naturalincrease,15)) / 2) ×  15 / TotPop) 
ActivityRate =  1- 1 ×  (NonActive_Pop) / (TotPop- cannotwork) 
agingrateeu =  0.004 
AgrdemandfromTRtoEU =  max(min((((agrprices) / (baragrEUTR ×  
CPIAgrEU))^0.407) ×  ((DeamndagrTR / (productivityAgrTR))^2.788) ×  
(DeamndagrTR^(0.015)) ×  exp(- 1.189) ×  1.106,DeamndagrTR),0) 
barAgrEU =  1.118 
baragrEUTR =  1.28 
barAgrTR =  1.84 
barIndEU =  1.11 
barindTR =  1.062 
barindTREU =  1.038 
BarrierstoImTREU =  233 
barsereu =  1.101 
barserTR =  1.28 
barserTREU =  1.038 
bartoImEU =  1200 
bartoImfromTR =  380 
birthrateeu =  0.0105- ramp(0.00008) 
budgetdeficit =  TaxIncomeTR- GovernmentExpenditures- EducationfundsTR ×  0- 
GovtInvestmentsTR- step(200,1)+ step(100,9) ×  0+ ramp(5,15) 
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 CPIAgrEU =  1.057 
CPIAgrRoW =  1.037 
CPIIndEU =  1.033 
CPIIndRoW =  1.03 
CPIRoW =  1.78+ ramp(0.03 ×  (1+ ramp(0.03))) 
DeamndagrTR =  max(DisposableIncomeTR- DeamndserTR__- 
DeamndindTR,DisposableIncomeTR ×  0.1) 
DeamndindTR =  exp(8.028) ×  ((DisposableIncomeTR / TotPop)^0.959) ×  
(LiteracyTR^0.624) ×  (TotPop^0.453) 
DeamndserTR__ =  exp(12.009) ×  ((DisposableIncomeTR / TotPop)^0.997) ×  
(Weighted_Literacy^0.284) 
deathrateeu =  0.0097- ramp(0.00005) 
DemandAgrEU =  exp(3.828) ×  ((DisposableIncomeEU_ / TotPopEU)^0.959) ×  
(TotPopEU^0.453) 
DemandIndEU__ =  DisposableIncomeEU_- DemandserEU_- DemandAgrEU 
demandRoWAgr =  TotaldemandRoW- DemandRoWInd- DemandRowSer 
DemandRoWInd =  exp(- 1.202) ×  (TotaldemandRoW^1.03) 
DemandRowSer =  exp(- 4.72) ×  (TotaldemandRoW^1.101) 
DemandserEU_ =  exp(- 9.521) ×  (DisposableIncomeEU_^1.137) ×  1000 
DisposableIncomeEU_ =  IncomeEU- TaxIncomeEU ×  (investmentrateeu)- 
Funds_toTR 
DisposableIncomeTR =  IncomeTR ×  (1- taxratetr)+ 0.5 ×  Capital_UsedTR / 
1000000000+ TaxIncomeTR- GovtInvestmentsTR 
EducationfundsTR =  0.008 ×  (TaxIncomeTR)+ Funds_toTR ×  0.05 
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 EffectiveAgrdemand_from_EUtoTR =  ((CPIAgrEU / (baragrEUTR ×  
agrprices))^(1.443)) ×  ((DeamndagrTR)^(- 1.31)) ×  
(DemandAgrEU^0.136) ×  exp(- 11.852) ×  1.428 ×  
((productivityAgrTR)^5.034) 
EffectiveIndDemfromEUtoTR =  exp(1.57778) ×  1.0052 ×  
(DemandIndEU__^1.0898) ×  (productivityIndEU^(- 1.2417)) ×  
(((Indpricestr) ×  barindTREU / CPIIndEU)^(- 0.1397)) ×  
(productivityIndTR^(2.7946+ ramp(0.004,20))) ×  (DeamndindTR^(- 
2)),productivityIndTR ×  7 / 12) 
EffectiveIndDemFromTRtoEU =  exp(- 4.65699) ×  1.003 ×  
((productivityIndEU)^0.0339) ×  (DemandIndEU__^0.04587) ×  
(DeamndindTR^1.77376) ×  (((Indpricestr / delay(Indpricestr,1)) / 
(CPIIndEU ×  barindTREU))^0.0798) ×  (productivityIndTR^(- 0.1248))+ 
servexpTR ×  (0.3+ - ramp(0.03,20)),DeamndindTR+ servexpTR ×  (0.1- 
ramp(0.02,20))) 
Effective_AgrDemEU =  1.046 ×  (((CPIAgrRoW) / (barAgrEU ×  
CPIAgrEU))^0.407) ×  (demandRoWAgr^0.175) ×  exp(- 1.189)+ 
AgrdemandfromTRtoEU- 1.166 ×  (((CPIAgrRoW ×  barAgrEU) / 
(CPIAgrEU))^(- 1.379)) ×  (demandRoWAgr^(- 1.043)) ×  
(DemandAgrEU^0.405) ×  exp(1.65)- EffectiveAgrdemand_from_EUtoTR+ 
DemandAgrEU 
Effective_AgrDemTR =  DeamndagrTR- ImpagrTR+ TotalExportsAgr 
Effective_SerDemEU =  serdemandTRtoEU+ DemandserEU_- serdemandEUtoTR- 
0.005 ×  1.146 ×  exp(- 0.6438) ×  ((PrSerEU__)^3.886) ×  ((CPIRoW ×  
barsereu)^(- 1.429)) ×  (DemandRowSer^1.277) / 10000000 
Effective_SerDemTR =  DeamndserTR__+ servexpTR- servimpTR 
Funds_toTR =  (0.0001) ×  TaxIncomeEU ×  0 
GovtInvestmentsTR =  TaxIncomeTR ×  0.02 
 ImpagrTR =  1.16 ×  (((agrprices / delay(agrprices,1)) / (CPIAgrRoW ×  
barAgrTR))^0.407) ×  (DeamndagrTR^3.963) ×  ((productivityAgrTR+ 1)^(- 
3.788)) ×  exp(- 1.189)+ AgrdemandfromTRtoEU,DeamndagrTR) 
IncomeEU =  productivitySerEU+ productivityIndEU+ productivityAgrEU+ 
Investmentsabroad ×  0.005 
IncomeTR =  (productivityAgrTR+ Funds_toTR ×  0.8+ productivityIndTR+ 
productivitySerTR)+ 0 ×  (AgrTR+ IndTR+ ServicesTR)+ 0 ×  
(wages_on_agrTR_+ wages_on_indTR_+ wages_on_serTR_)+ (AgrCapTR+ 
IndCapitalTR+ CapitalAccumTR+ SerCapTR) / 5000000000 
interestpaymenttr =  debtTR ×  0.1 ×  5 
investmentrateeu =  0.05 
LiteracyTR =  Weighted_Literacy / TotPop 
minwageTR =  100+ ramp(ServicespricesTr / delay(ServicespricesTr,1)) 
percapitaEU =  800000 ×  (4 ×  IncomeEU / 5+ 0.2 ×  (Effective_AgrDemEU+ 
Effective_SerDemEU+ totalDemandforEUInd)) / TotPopEU 
percapitaincomeTR =  ((1000000000 ×  (productivityAgrTR+ productivityIndTR+ 
productivitySerTR) / (2 ×  TotPop)+ IncomeTR ×  1000000000 / (2 ×  
TotPop)+ totalimports ×  1000000000 / (TotPop))) / 4 
percapitaworld =  3000 ×  (1+ ramp(0.03 ×  (1+ ramp(0.03)))) 
Populationincrease =  0.027- ramp(0.0005)- DELAY(0.004 ×  
LiteracyTR,LiteracyTR) 
popworld =  6000000000 ×  (1+ ramp(0.025)) 
productivityAgrEU =  AgrEU / 1000 
productivityAgrTR =  exp(- 106.109) ×  ((AgrTR^LiteracyTR)^0.072) ×  
(landuse^11.24) ×  (AgrCapTR^0.068),300000000000000) / 1000 
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 productivityIndEU =  IndEU ×  0.0014 
productivityIndTR =  (IndCapitalTR^0.174) ×  ((IndTR^(LiteracyTR))^0.087) ×  
exp(4.539) / 1000 
productivitySerEU =  sereu / 1000 
productivitySerTR =  exp(8.404) ×  ((ServicesTR^(LiteracyTR))^0.103) ×  
(SerCapTR^0.015) / 1000 
propensitytoconsumecapitalTR =  0.05 
PrSerEU__ =  1.78+ ramp(0.037 ×  (1+ ramp(0.37))) 
Quotaonmigration =  (TotPop^(1 / (BarrierstoImTREU ×  BarrierstoImTREU))) ×  
TotPop / (BarrierstoImTREU ×  10000) 
ratioofAgr =  1 ×  AgrTR / (IndTR+ AgrTR+ ServicesTR) 
RatioofInd =  1 ×  IndTR / (AgrTR+ IndTR+ ServicesTR) 
RatioofServices =  1- ratioofAgr- RatioofInd 
serdemandEUtoTR =  exp(9.6438) ×  ((PrSerEU__)^1.886) ×  ((ServicespricesTr)^(- 
1.429)) ×  (productivitySerTR^0.177) / 1000 
serdemandTRtoEU =  1.042 ×  exp(1.498) ×  (DemandserEU_^0.893) ×  
(productivitySerTR^(- 0.095)) ×  (LiteracyTR^3.504) ×  ((ServicespricesTr / 
(PrSerEU__ ×  barserTREU))^1.1) / 1000 
servexpTR =  (exp(- 0.6438) ×  ((CPIRoW)^3.886) ×  (((ServicespricesTr))^(- 
1.429)) ×  (productivitySerTR^1.277) / 1000+ serdemandEUtoTR) 
servimpTR =  exp(3.098) ×  (DemandRowSer^0.793) ×  (productivitySerTR^(- 
0.795)) ×  (LiteracyTR^3.504) ×  ((ServicespricesTr / (CPIRoW ×  
barserTR))^1.1) / 10000+ serdemandTRtoEU 
TaxIncomeEU =  taxrateEU ×  IncomeEU 
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 TaxIncomeTR =  taxratetr ×  IncomeTR+ Funds_toTR ×  0.95+ (debtTR- 
delay(debtTR,1))- interestpaymenttr 
taxrateEU =  0.566 
taxratetr =  0.644 
totalDemandforEUInd =  exp(- 0.15699) ×  1.009 ×  (productivityIndEU^0.0339) ×  
(DemandIndEU__^0.04587) ×  (DemandRoWInd^0.65128) ×  
(((CPIIndRoW) / (CPIIndEU ×  barIndEU))^0.0798) / 1000- 
EffectiveIndDemfromEUtoTR+ EffectiveIndDemFromTRtoEU- exp(1.7778) 
×  (DemandIndEU__^1.0898) ×  (productivityIndEU^(- 1.2417)) ×  
((CPIIndRoW ×  barindEU / CPIIndEU)^(- 0.1397)) ×  
(DemandRoWInd^0.7946) ×  1.0157 / 1000 
totaldemandforTRInd =  DeamndindTR- totalindexptr+ totalimptrind 
TotalExportsAgr =  1.65 ×  (((agrprices / delay(agrprices,1)) ×  barAgrTR / 
(CPIAgrRoW))^(- 1.379)) ×  (DeamndagrTR^(- 1.043)) ×  
(demandRoWAgr^0.405) ×  exp(1.65)+ EffectiveAgrdemand_from_EUtoTR 
Totalforeigninvestment =  (Foreigninvestment+ InvestmentsfromtheEU) / 100 
totalimports =  totalimptrind+ servimpTR+ ImpagrTR 
totalimptrind =  exp(- 0.15699) ×  1.005 ×  (DeamndindTR^0.77376) ×  ((Indpricestr 
/ (CPIIndRoW ×  barindTR))^0.0798) ×  (productivityIndTR^(- 0.1248))+ 
EffectiveIndDemFromTRtoEU) 
totalindexptr =  exp(1.7778) ×  1.008 ×  (DemandRoWInd^1.0898) ×  (((Indpricestr 
/ delay(Indpricestr,1)) ×  barindTR / CPIIndRoW)^(- 0.1397)) ×  
(productivityIndTR^2.7946) ×  (DeamndindTR^(- 2))+ 
EffectiveIndDemfromEUtoTR 
totallabourdemandEU =  111328.8+ (productivityAgrEU+ productivityIndEU+ 
productivitySerEU) ×  0.05 
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 TotPop =  AgrTR+ IndTR+ ServicesTR+ UnemployedTr+ NonActive_Pop+ 
cannotwork 
TotPopEU =  UnemployedEU+ totallabourdemandEU+ nonactiveEU 
tradedeficit =  TotalExportsAgr- totalimports+ totalindexptr+ servexpTR 
tradedeficiteu =  EffectiveAgrdemand_from_EUtoTR- AgrdemandfromTRtoEU+ 
EffectiveIndDemfromEUtoTR- EffectiveIndDemFromTRtoEU+ 
serdemandEUtoTR- serdemandTRtoEU 
UERateTR =  1 ×  UnemployedTr / (TotPop ×  ActivityRate) 
UnEmpEU =  UnemployedEU / TotPopEU 
wages_on_agrTR_ =  max((Weighted_Literacy^0.05) ×  ((1000000 ×  
productivityAgrTR / AgrTR)^0.715) ×  (((UnemployedTr+ cannotwork+ 
NonActive_Pop) / TotPop)^(- 3.171)) ×  exp(2.069),minwageTR) 
wages_on_indTR_ =  max((((NonActive_Pop+ cannotwork ×  0+ UnemployedTr) / 
TotPop)^(- 0.339 ×  0)) ×  ((Weighted_Literacy / TotPop)^0.5) ×  
((10000000 ×  productivityIndTR / IndTR)^0.798) ×  
exp(1.559),minwageTR)) 
wages_on_serTR_ =  max(exp(2.42) ×  ((Weighted_Literacy / TotPop)^0.8) ×  
((1000000 ×  productivitySerTR / ServicesTR)^0.931) ×  (((UnemployedTr+ 
NonActive_Pop+ cannotwork) / TotPop)^(0)),minwageTR) 
yearsofeducation =  3.5^(LiteracyTR / 2) 
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